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Summary 
Copyright and the right to freedom of expression both constitute fundamental 
rights in the European Union (EU) and should be protected accordingly. But 
what is the closer relationship, de jure and de facto, between these two legal 
regimes in the information society? This is one of three questions examined in 
this thesis. The presentation gives at hand that, traditionally, the notion has 
been that copyright accommodates or even promotes freedom of expression 
and that the two rights are compatible. However, it is also demonstrated that 
the two rights inherit a built-in legal conflict and that copyright inevitably 
imposes a restriction on freedom of expression.  
 
It is illustrated that the conflict-oriented perspective has gained a great deal of 
attention recently as the friction between the two regimes has increased 
significantly. More specifically, the scope of copyright protection has become 
wider and stronger in recent time, while, at the same time, new web technology 
has made it much more common that people exercise their right to freedom of 
expression and information in a way that involves material protected by 
copyright. It is therefore concluded that the intersection between copyright and 
freedom of expression presents a potential de jure conflict, which de facto 
concerns a broad circle of people. 
 
The second question addressed in this thesis is therefore one of enhanced 
significance, namely whether the constitutional right to freedom of expression 
can be successfully invoked as an “external” defense argument in a case where 
the contested action cannot be subsumed under any of the exemptions existing 
“internally” within copyright law. The presentation gives at hand that, thus far, 
Swedish courts have for various reasons abstained from applying such 
solutions. However, the direct applicability of international and supranational 
human rights instruments in domestic courts may have altered the legal 
situation.  
 
Interestingly, not only the incorporation into national law of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) but 
also the enactment of a legally binding Charter of Fundamental Rights for the 
European Union (EU Charter) sheds new light on the issues at hand. To the 
extent clashes between copyright and freedom of expression occur within the 
scope of EU law, the question of whether a conflict can be solved by 
application of fundamental rights is no longer only a matter of whether higher-
ranking national constitutional provisions should affect the application of 
domestic copyright rules, but also a question of whether a judicial review on 
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the conformity of EU secondary law with EU primary law should be 
undertaken. It is therefore worth noting that the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (ECJ) in three recent landmark cases has held that national 
courts are required to strike a fair balance between the protection of copyright 
and the protection of other rights enshrined in the EU Charter, such as the 
right to freedom of expression, when applying national provisions stemming 
from EU Copyright Directives. These cases are thoroughly analyzed in this 
thesis.  
 
Thirdly, some consequences associated with the application of constitutional 
rights in copyright infringement cases are outlined. Arguments are presented as 
for why an increased application should be welcomed. However, it is 
simultaneously recognized that, for various reasons, the constitutional tool 
should be applied with caution.  
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Sammanfattning 
Upphovsrätt och rätten till yttrandefrihet faller båda in under kategorin 
fundamentala rättigheter inom den Europeiska unionen (EU) och de förtjänar 
att åtnjuta skydd därefter. Men vad är det närmare rättsliga och faktiska 
förhållandet mellan dessa båda rättigheter i dagens informationssamhälle? 
Detta är en av tre frågor som skärskådas i uppsatsen. Presentationen ger vid 
handen att den traditionella uppfattningen har varit att upphovsrätt 
ackommoderar eller till och med främjar yttrandefrihet och att det råder 
kompatibilitet rättigheterna emellan. Men uppsatsen visar också att det finns en 
inbyggd rättslig konflikt mellan rättigheterna och att upphovsrätt 
ofrånkomligen utgör en begränsning av yttrandefriheten.         
 
Framställningen visar vidare att det konfliktorienterade perspektivet har rönt 
betydligt mer uppmärksamhet på senare tid. Anledningen till detta är att 
friktionen mellan de båda rättigheterna har ökat väsentligt. Närmare bestämt 
har omfattningen av det upphovsrättsliga skyddet utökats på både bredden och 
djupet på senare tid, samtidigt som framväxten av ny nätbaserad teknologi har 
gjort det vanligare att personer utövar sin yttrandefrihet på ett sätt som 
involverar material skyddat av upphovsrätt. Det går därför att sluta sig till 
uppfattningen att gränssnittet mellan upphovsrätt och yttrandefrihet de jure 
innefattar en potentiell konflikt, vilken de facto påverkar en bred krets av 
personer. 
 
Mot den bakgrunden blir nästa fråga som behandlas i uppsatsen särskilt 
intressant, nämligen huruvida konstitutionella bestämmelser om yttrandefrihet 
kan åberopas som ett ”externt” försvarsargument i rättsprocesser där den 
omstridda handlingen inte kan subsumeras under något av de undantag som 
återfinns ”internt” inom upphovsrätten. Utredningen ger vid handen att 
svenska domstolar hittills av olika anledningar har avstått från att tillämpa 
sådana lösningar. Men framställningen visar samtidigt att den direkta 
tillämpligheten i nationella domstolar av internationella och överstatliga 
instrument till säkerställande av grundläggande fri-och rättigheter kan ha 
förändrat rättsläget något.      
 
Intressant nog har inte bara inkorporeringen av den Europeiska konventionen om 
skydd för de mänskliga rättigheterna och de grundläggande friheterna (ECHR) utan också 
ikraftträdandet av den juridiskt bindande Europeiska unionens stadga om de 
grundläggande rättigheterna (EU Charter) kastat nytt ljus på den aktuella 
problematiken. I den utsträckning en konflikt mellan upphovsrätt och 
yttrandefrihet faller inom ramen för EU-rätten hamnar nämligen frågan 
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huruvida en lösning kan ske genom tillämpning av fundamentala rättigheter i 
ett annat läge. Problematiken gäller då inte endast huruvida nationella 
grundlagsregler ska låtas påverka tillämpningen av inhemsk lag av lägre rang, 
utan också om en domstol ska föranledas att pröva förenligheten mellan 
unionens primär- och sekundärrätt. Noterbart är därför att Europeiska 
unionens domstol (ECJ) i tre färska avgöranden har fastslagit att det åligger 
nationella domstolar att åstadkomma en skälig avvägning mellan intresset av att 
skydda upphovsrätt och intresset av att skydda andra rättigheter upptagna i 
EU-stadgan, såsom rätten till yttrandefrihet, när de tillämpar nationella 
bestämmelser som härrör ur EU-rättsliga direktiv. Dessa tre avgöranden 
analyseras grundligt i uppsatsen.     
 
För det tredje utreds vilka konsekvenser tillämpningen av konstitutionella 
rättigheter i mål om upphovsrättsintrång medför. Flera argument till stöd för 
en ökad tillämpning framförs. Samtidigt framhålls att sådana externa lösningar 
är förenade med vissa negativa konsekvenser och att det konstitutionella 
verktyget därför bör användas med försiktighet.  
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1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Background, purpose and question 
formulations 
There are several subjects that I have enjoyed in particular during my law 
school studies: international law and human rights, civil law in general and 
intellectual property law in particular, EU law and civil procedural law. And 
although it has not necessarily been an end in itself to combine aspects from all 
these various fields of law into one thesis, the subject matter of this study 
actually offers the possibility to do so. The purpose of this thesis is namely to 
examine the relationship between copyright and freedom of expression in the 
European Union, a subject that raises a number of interesting questions.  
 
The primary aim, however, is to examine to what extent constitutional 
provisions on freedom of expression can have an impact on the outcome in 
cases concerning copyright infringement. Also, focus will be on activities that 
occur in the online environment where the friction between the two legal 
regimes is most present. The subject matter is highly topical since the legal 
landscape has been somewhat redrawn in recent time, while, simultaneously; 
the factual circumstances under which potential conflicts may arise have 
undergone significant changes. Moreover, the ECJ has recently laid down three 
landmark rulings on the relationship between copyright and other fundamental 
rights. It is therefore interesting to evaluate how the issues at hand are 
addressed within the context of EU law.   
 
The following question formulations present the basis for the presentation and 
analysis below:  
 
i) What is the relationship, de jure and de facto, between copyright and freedom 
of expression in the information society?  
 
ii) Can the constitutional right to freedom of expression successfully be 
invoked as a defense in copyright infringement cases? 
 
iii) What are the consequences of applying, or not applying, the constitutional 
right to freedom of expression in copyright infringement cases?  
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1.2 Two hypothetical examples 
Two hypothetical cases can provide a backdrop to the discussion. They both 
actualize interesting questions on the relationship between copyright and 
freedom of expression in the information society and we will return to them at 
the very end of this thesis.   
 
First, imagine a case in which the management company “A”, which inter alia 
represents music composers, authors and photographers, has sued “B”, a 
company that runs a popular website that allows users to create personal 
profiles containing blogs, vlogs, podcasts et cetera and thus share information 
such as text excerpts, pictures, music and videos with each other.  
 
A has identified that the users commonly use works in its repertoire as parts of 
the content that they upload and share with each other. A argues that B 
contributes to large-scale copyright infringement and that the Court should 
issue a permanent injunction that in practice requires B to install a system that 
monitors users whom have been identified as copyright-infringers in the past, 
and which filters out copyright-protected content that is not allowed to be 
published without A’s consent. A has agreed to bear half of the costs 
associated with installment and service of the system.  
 
B on the other hand argues that “Our website empowers ordinary citizens with 
the tools to create, assemble and share various forms of information. The 
content being shared can constitute a wide range of expressions; from trivial 
self-expression to artistic expression, citizen journalism and political 
commentary. Although it can be debated to what extent all of these 
expressions are protected by constitutional provisions regulating freedom of 
expression, it is fair to say that considerable portions of them certainly are. 
Consequently, our website has in a way made freedom of expression more 
“free” as it has enabled citizens to impart and receive information on an 
unprecedented scale. The sought injunction would in fact constitute a 
censorship mechanism that puts these expressions to quite. Thus, the Court 
should decide not to grant the requested injunction.” 
 
In the second hypothetical case, an ordinary citizen comes across a video that 
shows some senior politicians making statements that manifestly expresses 
reprehensible beliefs. The person posts a large portion of the video on her blog 
and comments on the content. The film gains vast attention and sparks off a 
vivid debate of political significance. However, the person who took the film 
with his mobile phone, and whom sympathizes with the politicians on the film, 
sues the person whom published the clip for copyright infringement. During 
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the legal proceeding, it becomes clear that none of the exceptions existing 
within copyright law are applicable. However, the publisher argues that the 
video clip was of huge public interest and invokes the constitutional right to 
freedom of expression in her defense.  
 
 
1.3 Method and material 
This study is conducted with a traditional legal method. Accordingly, relevant 
legislation, travaux préparatoires, case law and legal doctrine have been examined.   
 
In recent time, central aspects of copyright law have been harmonized within 
the EU, not least through the adoption of the Copyright Directive1 and the 
Sanctions Directive2. Also, the EU has recently enacted a legally binding EU 
Charter. Naturally then, the focal point of this study is EU law. However, since 
copyright law has fallen within the scope of EU law only recently, since it has 
solely been harmonized but not yet unified, and since in the end it is up to 
national courts to apply the relevant provisions discussed in this thesis, a study 
of domestic law and cases must also be undertaken in order to provide a 
complete overview of the legal landscape.3 In this thesis, Swedish law will be 
the main object of study in this regard. As we shall see, this dual perspective 
also enables a deeper analysis of the impacts of EU law on the issues at hand. 
And as for instruments regulating fundamental rights, it must also be noted 
that Europe today has a pluralistic system for protection of such rights and 
that the ECHR also must be considered as an important complement to the 
EU Charter and the Swedish Constitution (below, consequences of this 
pluralistic legal order will be further elaborated upon). 
 
Case law from some other EU Member States will also be presented with the 
sole aim to provide a more comprehensive overview of the relationship 
between copyright and freedom of expression. With the same intent, legislation 
in some Western countries outside of the European Union will also be touched 
upon, albeit very briefly. However, it deserves to be emphasized that it is not 
part of the purpose of this thesis to provide a thorough comparative study 
between legislation or case law from different countries. This is important to 
note not least because the states at hand represent different legal traditions and 
a fully-fledged comparison therefore would require an in-depth analysis of the 
                                                
1 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. 
2 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
3 It may be appropriate to point out that “EU law”, of course, ultimately is an integral part of 
“domestic law”.  
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impacts of a system of civil law versus a system of common law on the issues 
at hand.  
 
 
1.4 Delimitations 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the applicability of the constitutional 
right to freedom of expression in cases where an action cannot be subsumed 
under an exception existing within copyright law. Therefore, it falls outside the 
scope of the topic to thoroughly evaluate to what extent lawmakers considered 
freedom of expression aspects when framing the rights and exceptions present 
within the current copyright system. Moreover, individual copyright provisions 
will only be presented to the extent it is fruitful to the present discussion. Also, 
the fact that this thesis focuses on confirmed infringements makes it irrelevant 
to discuss freedom of expression aspects related to measures for preserving 
evidence.  
 
An issue closely related to the one at hand is the relationship between 
copyright and freedom of the press. The latter is however not the focus of this 
thesis. Rather, attention is targeted on the potential conflict between copyright 
and freedom of expression in the online environment where the infringer is 
more likely to be an ‘ordinary citizen’ rather than a traditional media 
corporation. However the second hypothetical case above does to some extent 
constitute what could be labeled as ‘citizen journalism’ and the distinction 
between freedom of expression and freedom of the press can indeed be 
somewhat blurry. But again, the aim is not to focus on freedom of the press 
matters as such. Another related issue is the potential conflict between 
copyright and Chapter 2 in the Swedish Freedom of the Press Act (FPA), which 
regulates public access to documents. However, this relationship also falls 
outside the scope of this thesis.4 
 
Another consequence stemming from the fact that focus is put on activities 
occurring online is that it is difficult to avoid questions related to the liability of 
Internet intermediaries. As we shall see, a copyright-holder’s best chance to get 
to grips with large-scale infringements on the web is often to launch a 
proceeding against the operator of the service that facilitates the infringements. 
Accordingly, such issues will inevitably be a by-product of the discussion on 
the relationship between copyright and freedom of expression. However, it is 
of course beyond the purpose of this thesis to examine the scope of liability of 
these intermediaries as such.    
                                                
4 See instead Maunsbach & Wennersten p. 53-56.  
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Lastly, it may be noted that fundamental rights aspects arguably should be 
given particular weight in interim procedures, such as when a court decides on 
whether or not to grant a temporary injunction against an alleged copyright 
infringement. This is because these cases require the judges to make decisions 
based on less exactitude and on a more limited decision basis.5 However, due 
to the limited scope provided for, there will be no discussion on such particular 
issues in this thesis.   
 
 
1.5 Disposition 
At the outset, two general topics of relevance to this thesis will be outlined, 
namely the phenomenon of constitutional pluralism within Europe and the 
potential horizontal effect of fundamental rights in private disputes. These 
initial remarks aim at facilitating the understanding of the following 
presentation. Thereafter, the frameworks regulating copyright and freedom of 
expression respectively will be presented, after which an introduction to the 
relationship between these two rights will be given. The latter outline aims at 
presenting different views on the questions at hand that can be valuable to 
keep in mind when we then proceed to scrutinize case law from Sweden, some 
other EU Member States and from the ECJ. Also in this section, we will 
examine whether the legislators in Brussels, Strasbourg and Stockholm have 
opened up for the possibility to apply the constitutional right to freedom of 
expression in copyright cases when adopting copyright law. Next, we will have 
a look at the on-going policy discussion in Europe that provide food for 
thoughts de lege ferenda, but which also presents some interesting perspectives 
on the pros and cons attached to application or non-application of 
fundamental rights already existing in human rights instruments. Finally, a 
concluding analysis will be laid down in which the question formulations are 
addressed.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 See Westberg (2004) from p. 307. 
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2 Copyright and Freedom of 
Expression  
 
2.1 The legal framework 
2.1.1 Constitutional pluralism 
The citizens of Europe enjoy protection of their fundamental rights6 under 
various international (both universal and regional), supranational and national 
legal instruments. On the international level, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, 
is the most prominent example. UDHR is however not a legally binding 
document (although some argue that it has gained status as international 
customary law), but it is complemented by, as far as instruments of relevance 
for the subject of this thesis are concerned, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).  
 
Another international, albeit regional rather than universal, instrument in the 
field of human rights is the ECHR. The ECHR was drafted by the Council of 
Europe in the aftermath of World War II and is arguably the world’s most 
successful piece of international legislation for the protection of human rights.7 
Rights contained in the ECHR can be invoked directly before the national 
courts in signatory states (all EU Member States have signed the convention). 
National judicial decisions are also subject to review by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg.8 Since the buck stops at the desks of 
the judges of the ECtHR as far as interpretation and protection of human 
rights go, the ECtHR may be seen as a leading player when it comes to the 
definition of human rights in Europe.9  
 
In contrast to the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human 
Rights, the EU was not founded as a human rights organization. In fact, the 
original European Community Treaties contained no provisions on human 
                                                
6 Concerning the definition of the term ”fundamental rights”, Torres Pérez notes that rights 
might be regarded as fundamental if they are acknowledged as such by respective legal systems 
but that the term generally implies that the rights in question are ”hierarchically supreme norms, 
judicially protected against encroachment by public authorities, including the legislator”. For comments on 
the term through a Swedish perspective, see Lauer & Colombi Ciacchi p. 659.  
7 Janis et al. p. 3.  
8 Hugenholtz (2001) p. 5.  
9 Torres Pérez p. 27.  
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rights and in an early judgment, the ECJ declined to recognize that the EU 
legal order contained a system for protection of fundamental rights (the High 
Authority, the Commission’s predecessor, was not empowered to take into 
consideration principles of national constitutional law).10 Throughout the years 
however, the ECJ has developed a potent system for protection of human 
rights consisting of “general principles of EC law”. These principles are based 
on the ECHR and fundamental rights that are common to the constitutional 
traditions of the Member States.11 However, even though these sources are still 
parts of the EU’s human rights framework (and the EU is bound to accede to 
the ECHR12), the main source nowadays is the EU Charter, a “bill of rights” 
that became legally binding with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 
December 2009. The EU Charter enjoys the same legal value as the Treaties.13   
 
The provisions of the EU Charter are primarily addressed to the organs of the 
union, but they also apply to the Member States when they are “implementing 
Union law”.14 Thus, judges in national courts are bound to apply provisions 
contained in the EU Charter whenever union law comes into play and they are 
therefore no longer able to neglect this important source of law.15 Fundamental 
rights protected by the EU are, inter alia, binding on national courts when they 
apply national provisions that stem from EU directives.16 Since the EU Charter 
is supreme in relation to provisions in EU secondary law, cases can arise in 
national courts in which a party argues that national provisions are 
incompatible with rights stipulated in the EU Charter and thus should be 
declared invalid or should be interpreted in a manner that is in conformity with 
the EU Charter.17 In these cases, the national courts may and sometimes must 
ask the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.18   
 
Furthermore, fundamental rights are protected by the national constitutions of 
EU Member States. Consequently, several overlapping sources of human right 
provisions may be applicable in a case involving EU law. Although it would go 
beyond the scope of this thesis to thoroughly elaborate on issues related to this 
phenomena of pluralistic human rights protection, the further discussion will 
benefit from a few remarks in this regard. First, the ECJ has stated that it 
considers the EU Charter as the “principal basis” in terms of human right 
                                                
10 Case 1/58 Stork.  
11 TEU article 6 (3).  
12 TEU article 6(2).  
13 TEU article 6 (1).   
14 EU Charter article 51 (1) 
15 Bazzocchi p. 75. 
16 See for example Case C-442/00 Caballero.   
17 Melin, p. 905-906.  
18 TFEU article 267.  
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provisions that the EU courts will ensure to protect.19 Second, the ECJ has 
declared that union law is superior even to provisions in national 
constitutions.20 Third, if the EU Charter enshrines rights that correspond to 
rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be 
the same as those laid down by the ECHR (the union is, however, free to 
provide more extensive protection).21 The case law of the ECtHR is therefore 
of great relevance when interpreting the scope of rights contained in the EU 
Charter. Fourth, when enforcing fundamental rights, the ECJ must also take 
into consideration the specificities of national constitutions.22 Fifth, although 
international instruments are rarely invoked23, it shall be noted that the ECJ has 
also declared that it draws inspiration “from guidelines supplied by international 
treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of 
which they are signatories”.24 
 
Accordingly, provisions in the EU Charter will be the starting point in the 
discussion on fundamental rights below, with the ECHR and the case law of 
the ECtHR as valuable complementing sources. Specificities in the Swedish 
constitution will also be briefly touched upon, as will international instruments 
other than ECHR when and if it adds value to the discussion. When 
‘constitutional rights’ is used as a general term, reference is made to all relevant 
and applicable fundamental rights (notwithstanding the fact that the EU 
lawmaker deliberately decided against using the term ‘constitution’ when 
naming the EU Charter!).    
 
2.1.2 Horizontal effects of constitutional rights 
Another general issue of relevance is to what extent constitutional rights, inter 
alia the right to freedom of expression, have ‘horizontal effects’. A 
fundamental right is understood to have a horizontal effect when it has an 
impact on the relationship between private subjects, i.e. relationships regulated 
by private law.25 In other words, the question is whether a fundamental right 
cannot only be invoked by an individual in a process against the state (‘vertical 
effect’), but also against another private, ‘third’, party.26 
 
                                                
19 Discussion document of the ECJ (2010).  
20 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft.  
21 EU Charter, Article 53.  
22 Di Federico p. 29.  
23 Craig & De Búrqa p. 362.  
24 See e.g. joined cases C-20/00 and C-64/00, Booker Aquaculture Ltd, Hydro Seafood GSP Ltd and 
the Scottish Ministers.  
25 Ferreira et al. p. 8.  
26 Lauer & Colombi Ciacchi p. 667.  
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In Sweden, the legislator has yet to clearly recognize such horizontal effects of 
fundamental rights.27 And in correspondence, an examination of case law 
shows that defense arguments related to fundamental rights are seldom 
successful in private disputes. A ruling by the Swedish Supreme Court from 
1971 presents a clear-cut example.28 Through a counterclaim, the organizer of a 
horserace (a private company) had filed for an injunction that would, if 
granted, ban a horseracing magazine from being sold at or in proximity to the 
stadium where the race took place. When considering the publisher’s defense 
to this claim, the Court categorically rejected application of freedom of 
expression provisions in the Swedish Constitution (the Freedom of the Press Act, 
FPA). And although fundamental-right values have been given a somewhat 
stronger standing in a few other private disputes,29 the general understanding is 
that the Swedish courts traditionally have been reluctant to apply fundamental 
rights in private disputes.30 
 
However, as already mentioned, domestic courts in Europe also have to 
consider supranational and international instruments on fundamental rights. 
Therefore it must also be examined whether there are doctrines as to whether 
rights enshrined in these instruments can be applied horizontally. As for the 
ECHR, there is a seemingly broad consensus behind the notion that the 
Convention is applicable also on relations between individuals and, indeed, 
many domestic courts in Europe have applied the ECHR horizontally.31 
Accordingly, it has been held that with the incorporation of the ECHR into 
Swedish law, it became more apparent to the Swedish legislator and judges that 
fundamental rights could be applied horizontally.32 The travaux préparatoire of 
the incorporation act through which Sweden incorporated the ECHR seems to 
suggest that Convention rights can be applied when solving disputes between 
private parties, although it does not refer explicitly to the concept of 
‘horizontal effect’.33 As a result, provisions in the ECHR have been applied in 
                                                
27 Lauer & Colombi Ciacchi p. 669.  
28 NJA 1971 p. 571.  
29 For an example, see NJA 1996 p. 495 in which the Supreme Court of Sweden considered a 
party’s right to public access (Swe: allemansrätt) in its reasoning, although ultimately not ruling 
in favor of that party.  
30 Lauer and & Colombi Ciacchi p. 669 & Westberg (2004) p. 316. See also Westberg’s 
Privaträttsliga kontrakt och regeringsformen (1992), in which he points out that in the travaux 
préparatoire of the Government Form (GF), a clear distinction is made between relationships 
between the state and a private subject on the one hand and relations between two private 
subjects on the other. Westberg is however criticizing this perception, arguing that it stands in 
contrast to the wording of the Government Form. Moreover, Westberg argues that private 
rights ultimately must, by necessity, be enforced by the State via its courts and that it 
reasonably does not matter to a private subject whether his fundamental rights are violated by 
the State or a private entity.  
31 Geiger (2009) p. 29 and 33-34.  
32 Lauer & Colombi Ciacchi p. 695.  
33 See SOU 1993:40 Part B p. 107 and comments by Lauer & Colombi Ciacchi on p. 672.  
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cases between private parties also in Sweden.34 However, the great majority of 
cases in which references have been made to the ECHR have involved vertical 
effects of fundamental rights.35  
 
When it comes to horizontal effects of EU law, it should be recognized that 
this phenomenon has, traditionally, first and foremost concerned the 
fundamental freedoms (the free movement of people, goods, services and 
capital) upon which the single market is based, and the guarantees of equal 
treatment. Horizontal effects of fundamental rights is however somewhat more 
of a novelty, notwithstanding the fact that such rights, as we have seen, have 
played an important role within the EU legal order for a considerable time.36 
Against that backdrop, it has been speculated in as to whether the enactment 
of the EU Charter would further increase the applicability in private disputes 
of not only equal treatment provisions but also other fundamental rights, not 
least because rights acknowledged by the Union simply have become more 
apparent to judges and litigators alike.37  
 
We have seen above that the EU Charter primarily applies to the institutions 
and organs of the Union and that it applies to Member States only when they 
implement EU law. According to ECJ case law, this means that the obligation 
to respect rights enshrined in the EU Charter is only binding on the Member 
States when they act ‘within the scope of Union law’.38 This is a rather 
ambiguous concept and it is therefore hard to draw any lucid conclusions 
regarding the applicability in horizontal proceedings from that doctrine as 
such.39 However, although it is not expressed in Article 51 (1) of the EU 
Charter that the rights have effects also on relationships between subjects 
acting in a private capacity, case law from the ECJ shows that the EU Charter 
already has been applied in private proceedings.40 This has been held to suggest 
that the ECJ is interpreting rights enshrined in the Charter similarly to Treaty 
provisions that have a horizontal effect, or at least finds Charter provisions so 
persuasive in private disputes that the distinction becomes non-existent.41   
 
                                                
34 See for example the decision laid down by the Labor Court in AD 1998 no. 17.  
35 Lauer & Colombi Ciacchi p. 686-687.  
36 Lauer & Colombi Ciacchi p. 10.  
37 Se Groussot et al. p. 24 whom predict that so will likely be the case. See also Melin p. 906.   
38 Explanations Relating to the Charter of the of Fundamental Rights (2007/C 303/02). 
Explanation on Article 51 — Field of application.  
39 Groussot et al. p. 1 and pp. 24.  
40 See for example C-555/07 Kücükdeveci, C-400/10 Deticek, C-70/10 Scarlet Extended and C-
360/10 Netlog.  
41 Blackstock under the headline ”Titile VII – General Provisions Governing the Interpretation 
and Application of the Charter”.  
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2.1.3 Copyright 
2.1.3.1 Its raison d’être and the constitutional basis 
 
Copyright consists of an economic right, simply put a right to copy and 
distribute a work, and a moral right, which gives the author a personal right to 
decide how a work shall be used. Traditionally, main focus has been put on the 
former right in Anglo-Saxon countries, whereas copyright rather has its origin 
as a droit d’auteur in Continental Europe.42 Protection of copyright serves 
several purposes. For example, copyright promotes intellectual creativity and 
encourages authors to make their works public since they are assured that their 
right to the work will remain protected. Moreover, copyright serves a distinct 
moral purpose since it guarantees that the author’s name is mentioned when 
the work is used and that the work will not be exposed in a manner that 
offends the originator. And lastly, it can be mentioned that copyright law 
ensures protection of the considerable investments that commonly are required 
in order to make productions within the area of media and culture.43  
 
It follows from the EU Charter that copyright and other intellectual property 
rights are considered ‘fundamental’ by the Union. More specifically, Article 17 
(2) of the EU Charter states that “intellectual property shall be protected”. Article 52, 
which is a general provision that regulates the scope of rights guaranteed by 
the EU Charter, accompanies the somewhat definite proclamation in Article 17 
(2). Article 52 (1) stipulates that any limitation on the exercise of the rights and 
freedoms enshrined in the EU Charter must be “provided for by law and 
respect the essence of those rights and freedoms”. Also, it stems from the 
principle of proportionality that “limitations may be made only if they are necessary 
and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognized by the Union or the need to protect 
the rights and freedoms of others”. In contrast to the EU Charter, the ECHR does 
not explicitly acknowledge copyright as a basic human right. However, it is 
widely considered that the fundamental basis for the protection of copyright 
can be construed from the “property-clause” in Article 1 of the First Protocol 
to the ECHR (an economic right) as well as from Article 8 of the ECHR, 
which protects private life or family life (a moral right).44  
 
Similar to the ECHR, there is only an implicit constitutional ground for the 
protection of copyright in most of the national constitutions in Europe.45 The 
Swedish constitution, however, distinguishes itself as one of the few in Europe 
                                                
42 Olsson p. 32.  
43 Olsson p. 38-39.  
44 Geiger (2009), p. 32-33 and Rosén, Copyright and freedom of expression in Sweden, p. 360.  
45 Hugenholtz (2001), p. 4.  
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that expressly refers to copyright (or rather authors’ rights).46 Accordingly, it 
has been stated that no other EU Member State demonstrates a stronger 
constitutional support for copyright than does Sweden.47 Article 16 in Chapter 
2 of the GF stipulates, “Authors, artists and photographers shall own the rights to their 
works according to norms stated in statutory law”. Such norms are found in the 
Copyright Act (SCA).  
 
The UDHR and the ICESCR also deserve to be mentioned since these 
instruments contain language that seemingly aims at striking a balance between 
the rights of copyright-holders and other stakeholders’ right to freedom of 
expression. First, according to Article 27 (1) of the UDHR, “Everyone has the 
right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share 
in scientific advancement and its benefits”. This may be interpreted as a right to enjoy 
artistic results and to be informed and some have also concluded that the 
wordings declare a freedom of creativity.48 At the same time, Paragraph 2 in 
the same Article announces that “Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral 
and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he 
is the author.” It has been stated that read all together, these instruments (Article 
15 of ICESCR contains nearly identical language) support a flexible approach 
as countries are left with plenty of room to manoeuver as long as creators are 
guaranteed a fair remuneration for their efforts.49  
 
 
2.1.3.2 EU secondary law  
 
The EU lacks exclusive competence within the field of copyright and other 
intellectual property rights. However, the Union has for two decades 
harmonized certain aspects of copyright law through a series of directives in 
order to strengthen the single market, and the new Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) declare specific competence for unification within the 
sphere of intellectual property.50 Two directives of relevance for the present 
discussion are the Copyright Directive and the Sanctions Directive.  
 
The Copyright Directive was adopted in 2001 with the aim to facilitate the 
expansion of the information society in Europe and to enhance the 
                                                
46 Geiger (2009), p. 34 and Rosén, Freedom of expression in lineage with authors’ rights, p. 5. Rosén 
states that the Swedish Constitution is the only one in Europe referring explicitly to copyright, 
whereas Geiger mentions a few more examples.  
47 Rosén, Copyright and freedom of expression in Sweden, p. 365.  
48 Rosén, Copyright and freedom of expression in Sweden, p. 357-358.  
49 Geiger (2009), p. 31-32.  
50 Article 118 of the TFEU.  
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implementation of the four freedoms of the internal market.51 The Copyright 
Directive harmonizes copyright law by inter alia requiring all EU Member States 
to guarantee various subjects with the exclusive rights to reproduce or 
distribute their works, or to communicate them to the public by wire or 
wireless communication.52 The communication right inter alia includes the right 
to make available to the public works in such a manner that members of the 
public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by 
them.53 A typical example of “making available to the public”, to note, is the 
practicing of publishing a work on a website.54 Furthermore, the exclusive right 
to making available to the public has been granted not only to authors but also 
to inter alia film producers (so called neighboring rights).55 Associated with 
these rights are exceptions and limitations outlined in Article 5 of the 
Copyright Directive, which, according to Recitals 32, constitute an exhaustive 
enumeration of permissible restrictions. However, since copyright law is 
harmonized but not yet unified in the EU, limitations vary between EU 
Member States.  
 
However, a copyright would not mean much if there were no sanction 
mechanisms attached to it. Lucky for right-holders, the Sanctions Directive 
provides several means by which copyright may be enforced. Perhaps of most 
relevance to the present discussion is that the Directive stipulates that judicial 
authorities may issue an injunction aimed at prohibiting the continuation of a 
confirmed infringement or an interlocutory injunction targeted against an 
alleged infringer. Such injunctions may be subject to a recurring penalty 
payment in order to ensure compliance.56 The Member States shall also ensure 
that injunctions may be issued against intermediaries whose services are used 
by third parties for activities constituting infringement.57 This may be seen 
against the backdrop of paragraph 59 of the preamble to the Copyright 
Directive, which states that services of intermediaries may be increasingly used 
by third parties for infringing activities in the information society. It also 
concludes that the intermediaries are often best suited to bring and end to such 
infringements.  
 
Although it shall be noted that it is up to the EU Member States to decide the 
procedures and conditions for permanent or temporary injunctions58, EU law 
                                                
51 Recitals 1-3 of the Copyright Directive.  
52 Article 3-5 of the Copyright Directive.  
53 Article 3 (1) of the Copyright Directive.  
54 Proposition 2004/05:110 Upphovsrätten i informationssamhället – genomförande av 
direktiv 2001/29/EG, m.m. p. 45.  
55 Article 3 (2) of the Copyright Directive. 
56 Articles 9 and 11 of the Copyright Directive. 
57 Article 11 of the Sanctions Directive and Article 8 of the Copyright Directive.   
58 Headdon p. 139.  
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requires that measures, remedies and procedures are effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive.59 In Sweden, the legal basis for injunctions is found in Article 
53 b of the SCA. Also worth noting is that the Swedish travaux préparatoires, 
case law and doctrine prescribes a balance of interests prerequisite for 
injunctive relief.60 
 
 
2.1.4 Freedom of Expression 
As Helfer and Austin have pointed out, freedom of expression is such a vast  
and complex topic that it is impossible to briefly summarize its rationales. 
However, its most enduring raison d'être is probably that it simply provides a 
“marketplace of ideas”, the importance of which has perhaps best been 
described by John Stuart Mill whom in his work On Liberty stated that “since 
the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by 
the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth had any choice of being 
supplied”.61 Furthermore, Angelopoulos has argued that freedom of expression 
is an essential ingredient in the democratic process, that it fosters finding of the 
truth and that it promotes self-actualization, and that these rationales are so 
strong that the right enjoys an elevated position in the fundamental rights 
framework.62       
 
Article 11 (1) of the EU Charter declares that, “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers”. 
ECHR contains identical language in its Article 10 (1). It shall be noted that the 
texts explicitly state that the right to freedom of information is embedded in 
the right to freedom of expression. Indeed, in the absence of freedom of 
information, freedom of expression would be void of meaning.63 Moreover, 
the right to freedom of information may arguably not only encompass the right 
to receive and impart information, but also the right to seek information.64  
 
It follows from ECtHR case law that the protection offered in Article 10 of the 
ECHR shall be interpreted in a broad manner.65 Moreover, the ECtHR has 
                                                
59 Article 3 (2) of the Sanctions Directive and article 8 (1) of the Copyright Directive.  
60 See for example proposition 2008/09:67 and Sandfeld Jacobsen p. 172.  
61 Helfer & Austin p. 222-223 and Mill p. 98.  
62 Angelopoulos p. 329.  
63 Angelopoulos p. 330.  
64 See Akester p. 32, who argues that Article 10 of the ECHR must be interpreted in the light 
of its precursor, Article 19 of the ICCPR, which comprises the right to “seek” information and 
ideas.   
65 Hugenholtz (2001), p. 5.  
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concluded that the contours of the right vary with each generation.66 And 
whereas protection of political speech is perhaps what first comes to mind, the 
Strasbourg Court has made clear that artistic expressions also fall within the 
scope of article 10 (this is also in line with the aforementioned provisions in 
the UDHR and the ICESCR).67 Information of commercial nature is also 
protected according to the Court, however not to the same degree as political 
speech.68        
 
As for the scope of the right, it is once again Article 51 (1) of the EU Charter 
that sets out the prerequisites for permissible limitations, as that particular 
provision applies to all rights enshrined in the EU Charter (for a closer look on 
the requirements, see above). Moreover, the fact that freedom of expression is 
not an absolute right is clearly manifested in Article 10 (2) of ECHR. The 
provision stipulates that the right may be subject to limitations that: i) are 
prescribed by law, ii) protect at least one specified legitimate purpose such as 
the right of others and iii) are necessary in a democratic society. Case law from 
the ECtHR demonstrates that a restriction will fulfill the third requisite only if 
it answers to a pressing social need and is proportionate.69 Signatory states have 
been granted by the ECtHR a “margin of appreciation” when interpreting to 
what extent a limitation is necessary in a democratic society. However, this 
latitude varies on a case-by-case basis. Not surprisingly, the margin is narrower 
when dealing with political speech.70  
 
As further regards the national level, it may be noted that few European 
countries provide a scope of protection as broad as the one outlined in Article 
10 of the ECHR. But as was also the case in respect of copyright, Sweden is 
one exception.71 The Swedish legal order presents a strong and twofold 
constitutional protection for freedom of expression. First, Chapter 2 Article 1 
of the GF provides a broadly worded protection for freedom of expression in 
general. Secondly, expressions in certain forms or via particular media 
techniques are protected through two special constitutions, namely the FPA 
and the Freedom of Expression Act (FEA).  
 
 
                                                
66 Akester p. 32.  
67 See Müller and Others v. Switzerland, para 27.  
68 Hugenholtz (2001), p. 5.  
69 Sandfeld Jacobsen & Salung Petersen p. 178.  
70 Hugenholtz (2001), p. 5-6.  
71 Rosén in Copyright and freedom of expression in Sweden, p. 365-366 and Hugenholtz (2001), p. 6.  
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2.2 The relationship between copyright and 
freedom of expression 
 
2.2.1 Conflict or compatibility? 
There are somewhat different views on the relationship between copyright and 
freedom of expression represented in the legal discussion. On the one hand, 
there has traditionally been a perception that copyright accommodates freedom 
of expression, that the two disciplines are compatible with each other and that 
copyright not reasonably can be regarded as an impediment to freedom of 
expression and freedom of information.72 The main argument here is that, due 
to the idea/expression dichotomy present in copyright law, copyright does not 
restrict information or ideas as such and thus not freedom of expression.73  
 
Moreover, copyright may be seen as something that promotes and strengthens 
freedom of expression since it encourages speech by providing incentives to 
creators and to those investing in the dissemination of creative works.74 In 
other words, copyright and freedom of expression may be seen as sharing the 
same genesis and the same goal, as copyright too originates from the aspiration 
to assure free circulation of ideas in society, as well as to safeguard the public’s 
right to information.75 Notably, in Harper & Row76, the United States Supreme 
Court expressed support for this perspective by stating that copyright is “the 
engine of free speech”, concluding that there is no conflict between copyright and 
freedom of expression.  
 
On the other hand, many find it hard to ignore that copyright does indeed 
impose a restriction on speech and that there is in fact a legal conflict between 
the two rights. As we saw examining Article 11 of the EU Charter, the right to 
freedom of expression warrants “the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart information and ideas”. Assuming that all copyrights include at least some 
information and ideas, the risk for potential clashes between the two rights 
becomes apparent.77 In other words, it seems inevitable that a copyright-
holder’s exclusive right to certain expressions will prevent other people from 
expressing themselves the same way.78 In contrast to the cited holding in  
                                                
72 See for example Olsson p. 43.  
73 See e.g. Hugenholtz (2001), p. 6 and Sims p. 492 whom present this argument, however not 
supporting it.  
74 Helfer & Austin p. 222.  
75 Geiger (2007) p. 30-32.  
76 Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises.  
77 Hugenholtz (2001) p. 1.  
78 Rosén Freedom of expression in lineage with authors’ rights p. 1. See also Angelopoulos s. 328. 
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Harper & Row, this view was illuminated in a more recent case, Ashdown79, in 
which a British judge stated, “Copyright is antithetical to freedom of 
expression. It prevents all, save the owner of the copyright, from expressing 
information in the form of the literary work protected by the copyright.”   
 
In recent time, the more conflict-oriented perspective has gained a great deal 
attention among legal commentators.80 One reason for this is the steady 
proliferation and strengthening of copyright (and other intellectual property 
rights) that we have seen over the last decades.81 Some have even gone so far 
as to suggest that a paradigm shift has occurred in copyright law as the scope 
of protection has expanded to a point where it almost extends to information 
as such, and new sue generis and neighboring rights have been adopted to the 
detriment of the public domain.82 Burrell has pointed out that restrictions on 
freedom of expression, including the right to access information, might be the 
most controversial consequence of a stronger copyright system. Furthermore, 
he has pointed out that the fact that nearly all textual or visual material now is 
clothed in copyright leads to an order where anyone who attempts to support 
an argument with a photograph or an excerpt from a text will have to either 
bring himself under one of the exemptions or pay the right-holder a license 
fee.83  
 
At the same time, means by which people can exercise freedom of expression 
in forms that potentially violate copyright law have largely expanded. Through 
the development of what is commonly referred to as the web 2.084, ordinary 
citizens have been empowered with the tools to easily share so called user-
generated content (UGC). Although there is no consensus as to the definition 
of ‘UGC’, it has been held that it stands for material made publicly available via 
the Internet that reflects a considerable amount of creative effort, and that is 
produced outside the sphere of professional routines and practices.85 In 
accordance with that definition, UGC can take to the form of texts (i.e. blogs, 
encyclopedias, articles), images, audio or video.86 Moreover, UGC can be 
                                                
79 Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd. (2001).  
80 E.g. Angelopoulos, Burrell, Geiger, Hugenholtz and Sims.   
81 Hugenholtz (2001), p. 1, 6.  
82 Geiger (2007), p. 33-34.  
83 Burrell p. 377.  
84 Although there is no consensus on the definition of the buzzword “web 2.0”, a few 
suggestions may be picked out from the legal doctrine. In his article Opting out of the Internet in 
the United States and the European Union: Copyright, Safe Harbors, and International Law, on pages 
336-337, Travis defines the term web 2.0 as “diverse Internet-based services… distinguished by their 
somewhat richer multimedia content and higher degree of interactivity and user control…” Chik 
acknowledges on p. 244 that the characteristics of “web 2.0” are many but that they include: i) 
“the development of internet-based applications that are more user-centric in design” and ii) “increasing 
engagement in user collaboration; and the encouragement of both original and derivative UGC”.   
85 OECD’s report Participative Web: User-Generated Content.  
86 Chik p. 249.  
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divided into two groups, where one contains pure UGC meaning that the user 
produced all of the content, and where the other encompasses “remixed” or 
“mashup” UGC meaning that the user has mixed his or her own material with 
the content from other(s).87  
 
These UGC technologies may be labeled as “conversational media” in that 
they facilitate the publishing of one’s own material as well as comments on 
other user’s content.88 And in respect to freedom of expression, UGC plays an 
immensely important role as it allows ordinary people to exchange ideas on an 
unprecedented scale as everyone can be a publisher, radio network, TV-station, 
movie producer, newspaper, and record label, all in one.89 Indeed, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has 
concluded in a report that the web 2.0 provides “…an open platform enriching 
the diversity of opinions…various political and societal debates, the free flow 
of information and freedom of expression”.90  
 
The flip side, however, is that many users publish works created by other 
authors and thus violate copyright. It has even been held that copyright 
infringement has become the norm on UGC websites as users frequently post 
the complete works or excerpts from works of others without paying sufficient 
regard to copyright laws. This is of course troublesome for right-holders since 
UGC platforms allow users to step out of the private sphere and enter into the 
public domain. Another factor that is contributing to the problems for right-
holders is the difficulty to effectively monitor and police these activities and 
identify infringing content providers.91  
 
 
2.2.2 Internal or external solutions to potential 
conflicts?   
 
Another question is whether conflicts, if and when acknowledged, should be 
solved “internally” within the copyright framework, or if “external” 
constitutional provisions on freedom of expression can successfully be invoked 
in cases regarding copyright infringement. This issue is very much related to 
the aforementioned discussion on whether copyright and freedom of 
expression are at all at odds with each other. For example, it may be noted that 
                                                
87 Lee p. 1506.  
88 Helberger et al. p. 7.  
89 Lee p. 1501, 1504.   
90 OECD p. 90.  
91 Scerri & George p. 5-6, 8 and Helberger et al. p. 3, 20.  
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the idea/expression dichotomy sometimes is referred to when the 
”internalized” solution is described.92 Furthermore, Birnhack has introduced 
the terms ‘mechanical internalization’ and ‘substantive internalization’ to point 
out that the internal relationship may be looked at in respect of the mechanics 
that copyright law provides (such as the idea/expression dichotomy and 
exceptions to exclusive rights), but also in relation to the theories that 
underpins the copyright regime (according to Birnhack, this substantive 
internalization is illustrated in Harper & Row).93  
 
However, the sole purpose of using terms such as ‘internal/external solutions’ 
and ‘internal/external tools’ is of course to simplify the discussion at hand. In 
the following presentation, the different solutions will be considered as 
something that becomes relevant when the analysis has reached the point 
where a potential conflict between two expressions has been identified and the 
question is whether the situation shall be solved strictly by application of civil 
law, meaning that a an act is punishable if none of the exceptions existing 
within copyright law are applicable, or if constitutional provisions can be 
allowed to affect the outcome.  
 
Proponents of the former solution claim that the legislator has already struck 
an appropriate balance between copyright and freedom of expression when 
drafting copyright law, in particular through the various exemptions to the 
exclusive rights. More specifically, several of those exceptions have purposes 
more or less connected to freedom of expression values (the quotation right, 
exceptions for parodies/travesties, news reporting and the principle of public 
access et cetera).94 And as Rosén has noted, such limitations and exceptions tend 
to be explicit, exhaustive and interpreted narrowly in Europe.95 Also, we might 
recall from above that fundamental rights are not necessarily applicable in 
private disputes.  
 
But then again, more recently European scholars have started to acknowledge 
the independent relevance of the constitutional right to freedom of 
expression.96 The argument goes that the conflict between copyright and 
human rights in the information society might have escalated to the point 
where copyright’s internal safeguards no longer provide sufficient means by 
which to ensure a balance.97 For example, Hugenholtz has pointed out that 
                                                
92 See for example Hugenholtz (2001), p. 6.  
93 Birnhack p. 26-28.  
94 Hugenholtz (2001) p. 6, Rosén in Freedom of expression in lineage with authors’ rights, p. 2 and 
Levin p. 209-210.  
95 Rosén in Freedom of expression in lineage with authors’ rights p. 2.  
96 See for example Angelopoulos, Birnhack, Geiger (2009) and Hugenholtz (2001) who in note 
46 on p. 7 provides further references.  
97 Angelopoulos p. 333.  
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constitutional provisions on freedom of expression may serve as a “lifebuoy 
for bona fide users drowning in a sea of intellectual property”.98 At the end of 
this chapter, we will return to these arguments when the on-going policy 
discussion is examined.  
 
 
2.2.3 Has the potential ‘external’ conflict been 
adressed in legislation and case law?  
2.2.3.1 Considerations in relevant legislation 
 
At the outset, it shall be noted that the EU legal framework does not provide 
much guidance on issues in the intersection between copyright and European 
human rights law.99 For example, the document that contains explanations 
relating to the EU Charter does not provide any such detailed clarifications.100 
However, the recitals of more recent directives on intellectual property include 
more and more references to fundamental rights values. This is by no means 
irrelevant, as the recitals have influence on the interpretation of directives.101  
 
The Copyright Directive was initiated a couple of years prior to the new 
millennium, therefore there is no surprise that it, although addressing needs 
emerging in the information society, does not specifically address the sort of 
conflict between copyright and freedom of expression that now occurs on 
large scale on the web 2.0. However, the Directive states in Recitals 3 that the 
proposed harmonization would help to promote the implementation of the 
four freedoms of the internal market “and relates to compliance with the fundamental 
principles of law and especially of property, including intellectual property, and freedom of 
expression and the public interest”. Also, Recitals 31 stipulates that a fair balance of 
rights and interests must be safeguarded between various right-holders as well 
as between right-holders and “users of protected subject-matter”.  
 
Recitals 2 of the Sanctions Directive also contain general language that 
addresses the need to keep some sort of balance between different interests. 
The Recitals first declares that the protection afforded by intellectual property 
law shall allow the creator to derive legitimate profits from the creation, before 
acknowledging that the law should “allow the widest possible dissemination of works, 
ideas and new know-how” and that it should not impede inter alia freedom of 
expression and the free movement of information. Also, Recitals 32 states that 
                                                
98 Hugenholtz (2001), p. 1.  
99 Sandfeld Jacobsen & Salung Petersen p. 178.  
100 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007/C 303/02).  
101 Geiger (2006), p. 387.  
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the Directive “respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognized in 
particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union” (although it 
specifically refers only to the protection of intellectual property under 
Article 17(2) of the Charter).  
 
Furthermore, it is not least when considering questions on freedom on the 
Internet and when framing the proper liability of intermediaries that the 
European legislator has commented on fundamental right aspects of copyright 
law. It is stated in Recitals 9 of the E-commerce Directive102 that ”free movement 
of information society services can in many cases be a specific reflection in Community law of a 
more general principle, namely freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 10(1) of the 
ECHR” and that the Directive is not intended to have affect on national 
fundamental rules and principles in relation to freedom of expression. 
Furthermore, Recitals 46 of the Directive declares that a provider of an 
information society service that becomes aware of illegal activities shall act 
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information concerned, but 
that the removal or disabling of access ”has to be undertaken in the observance of the 
principle of freedom of expression…”  
 
As for the Swedish Constitution, it may be noted that copyright is explicitly 
exempt from the FPA and the FEA.103 The simple reason for this, according to 
the travaux préparatoire, is that copyright adheres to private law and that the FPA 
and the FEA do not regulate the relation between private parties.104 Moreover, 
a governmental study group has stated that the protection of copyright is an 
example of such interests that can legitimize a limitation to freedom of 
expression in accordance with Chapter 2 Article 13 of the GF.105 It may also be 
noted that Chapter 11 Article 14 of the GF in the past stipulated that Swedish 
courts should only set aside statutory law that conflicted with provisions in the 
constitution if the conflict was manifest. This is worth remembering when we 
later examine Swedish case law. However, it shall also be noted that this 
“manifest requisite” was abolished in 2010.    
 
National lawmakers also have to take into account European standards of 
human rights when implementing directives, as well as rights afforded by 
national constitutions to the extent directives leave room for such 
considerations.106 Hence, it may be noted that the Swedish government made a 
                                                
102 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the 
Internal Market.  
103 FPA Chapter 1 Article 8 and FEA Chapter 1 Article 12, which refers to said provision in 
the FPA.  
104 SOU 1947:60 p. 217.   
105 SOU 1975:75 p. 204. See also Ds 2005:54 p. 11.    
106 Geiger (2006), p. 388.  
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few comments on freedom of expression aspects when transposing the 
Sanctions Directive into Swedish law, namely in respect of the compatibility 
between injunctions and the constitutional ban on censorship.107 More 
precisely, such aspects were evaluated in relation to interlocutory injunctions 
and injunctions targeted against attempted infringement or preparation to 
commit infringement.  
 
The Swedish government concluded that the proposed rules were aimed at 
stopping actions that constituted infringement, not to prevent the actual content 
as such of the medias involved.108 In principle then, the ban on censorship 
regulated in FPA and FEA did not hinder the proposed legislation. 
Furthermore, the government stated that, if the issuance of an injunction 
would indeed come into conflict with the ban in a specific case, the judiciary 
would have to take into consideration the balance of interests prerequisite, 
which is, according to general principles of Swedish law, applicable when a 
Court decides on whether to grant an injunctive relief. However, the 
government anticipated that the rule of proportionality would mainly be 
accentuated in respect of interlocutory injunctions, and further stated that it 
could not be applied in a manner that conflicted with the overall aim to present 
right-holders with effective means to stop a continuing infringement.109  
 
 
2.2.3.2 Case law from Sweden  
 
In Swedish Flag110, the Supreme Court of Sweden ruled for the first time on the 
relationship between copyright and freedom of expression. A Swedish hymn 
had been recorded without the original composers’ consent and with new lyrics 
that criticized the war in Vietnam. The defendant argued that the Court should 
interpret the parody/travesty exemption liberally on such political criticism. 
The Court, however, held that copyright protects private interests and that the 
copyright-holder should not have to suffer from a limitation of his rights due 
to a political controversy he was not a part of.  
 
In a later case, Manifesto111, the Court elaborated more thoroughly on the status 
of freedom of expression defenses in copyright cases. This case concerned a 
                                                
107 Proposition 2008/09:67 Civilrättsliga sanktioner på immaterialrättens område – 
genomförande av direktiv 2004/48/EG. I may be noted that freedom of expression values 
also were evaluated in respect of measures for preserving evidence. However, as noted above, 
such issues fall outside the scope of this thesis and they are therefore not touched upon.   
108 Proposition 2008/09:67 p. 192.  
109 Proposition 2008/09:67 p. 193.  
110 NJA 1975 p. 679.   
111 NJA 1985 p. 893.  
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not yet published manifesto that outlined the future objective of the 
Gothenburg City Theater. At the outset, the Court found that the interest of 
the copyright-holder was relatively weak in the case at hand, whilst the reasons 
to uphold freedom of expression were rather strong. The question then was if 
the Court could rule in favor of the defendant even though the committed act 
did not fall under any of the exemptions in the SCA. As for the constitutional 
right to freedom of expression, the Court reasoned that these provisions were 
only addressed to the legislator, but that they nevertheless were ‘illustrative’ in 
the case at hand. However, the Court concluded that the legislator had already 
considered freedom of expression aspects when drafting the law, and that it 
was up to the politicians to impose any further limitations. However, the Court 
did simultaneously acknowledge that freedom of expression interests could, 
but only in rare cases, be of such profound nature that the Court would have 
to apply Chapter 24 Article 4 of the Penal Code (which regulates acts 
committed out of necessity) to declare non-punishment.  
 
The most recent case in which the Swedish Supreme Court laid down a ruling 
on the nexus between copyright and freedom of expression is Mein Kampf.112 
Here the Court underlined once again that the Swedish Parliament had already 
struck an appropriate balance between the two interests. In addition, it is 
interesting to note that the case was decided after the incorporation of the 
ECHR into Swedish law. The Court acknowledged that the legal situation had 
somewhat changed after the incorporation of the ECHR and that the 
Convention possibly provided more room for freedom of expression 
considerations. More specifically, the Court reasoned that the Convention 
might provide legislative support for a ruling in which an infringement is 
declared non-punishable due to overtrumping freedom of expression aspects. 
However, the fact that the work at hand was of historic interest and was hard 
to get a hold of was not sufficient.   
 
Nor has, knowingly, a defense based on freedom of expression been successful 
in any district court or court of appeal. The case Church of Scientology113, in which 
a person had published texts belonging to the Church of Scientology online 
and handed in copies of the works to various authorities, is perhaps worth 
mentioning since the defendant in this case invoked Article 10 of the ECHR 
arguing that the Court should decide against awarding compensation for 
damages. According to the defendant, the publishing of the texts aimed at 
making it possible for the public to form a view about the Church. However, 
the Svea Court of Appeal paid scant attention to the argument and solely held 
that the argument did not “lead to any different conclusion”.  
                                                
112 NJA 1998 p. 838.  
113 Case T 1096-98.  
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2.2.3.3 Case law from some other EU Member States 
 
A brief look at case law from some other EU Member States depicts a 
somewhat fragmented picture in terms of how the judiciaries in Europe have 
dealt with freedom of expression aspects in copyright cases. At the one hand, 
there are decisions in which the supreme courts categorically have refused to 
pay regard to defenses based on freedom of expression.114 On the other hand, 
there are at least some more recent cases in which European courts have been 
pursued by arguments related to freedom of expression and where 
constitutional provisions have been used, more or less, as an external tool.  
 
One such approach used by European courts faced with the conflict has been 
to interpret rights and limitations in conformity with constitutional 
provisions.115 Germania 3116, laid down by the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany, provides an instructive example. In this case, a play included 
extensive unauthorized material from another play. The Court concluded prima 
facie that the requisites contained in the quotation exemption were not fulfilled. 
However, the Court then decided to apply the right to quote in the light of a 
provision in the German Constitution that safeguards freedom of artistic 
expression. This provided for a liberal interpretation of the quoting right which 
then encompassed the artistic comment.  
 
In a few other cases, courts have gone as far as to override copyright law. One 
such example is Medienprofessor decided by the Supreme Court of Austria.117 In 
this case, a professor had published several news articles on his website with 
the aim to demonstrate that a large-scale media campaign had been launched 
against him. More specifically, 16 Articles had been published in their entirety 
and the Court found that the quotation right was not applicable. However, the 
Supreme Court of Austria noted that the professor had exercised his freedom 
of expression and information in accordance with Article 10 of ECHR. The 
Court concluded that the content of the articles could be adequately addressed 
only if they were published in their entirety and that freedom of expression 
prevailed over copyright in the present case.   
 
                                                
114 For a presentation of cases in which European courts have refused to apply constitutional 
provisions on freedom of expression in copyright cases, se Geiger (2009) p. 44. 
115 Hugenholtz & Senftleben p. 11.  
116 Germania 3 Gespenster am toten Mann, Federal Constitutional Court 29 June 2000.  
117 Medienprofessor, the Supreme Court of Austria, 12 June 2001, 33 IIC 994 (2002).  
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Lastly, Ashdown, a British case already mentioned above, highlights that a court 
may also accommodate freedom of expression interests by deciding against 
imposing a certain sanction. The alleged infringer, Sunday Telegraph, had 
published politically sensitive minutes taken by the leader of the British Liberal 
Democrats during a secret meeting with then Prime Minister Tony Blair. The 
Court of Appeal stated that rare circumstances could arise in which the right to 
freedom of expression comes into conflict with copyright, notwithstanding the 
express exemptions under the British Copyright Act. In these cases, the Court 
was bound to apply the copyright law in a way that accommodated the right to 
freedom of expression. The Court’s solution was not to apply any of the 
existing exemptions liberally or to create an external exemption, but to decide 
against granting an injunction. However, since the Court had not set aside 
substantive law as such and the action therefore still constituted an 
infringement, the copyright-holder was instead entitled to damages.118 
 
  
2.2.3.4 The ECJ provides further guidance  
 
Although ECtHR case law presents an extensive amount of freedom of 
expression precedents, the Court has, knowingly, not yet ruled on the potential 
conflict between freedom of expression and copyright. However, the ECJ has 
in some recent landmark cases considered the relationship between different 
fundamental rights in relation to protection of intellectual property on the 
Internet.  
 
First, in Promusicae119, the ECJ clearly stated that the right to property under EU 
law, including intellectual property, is not an absolute right. The case involved 
Promusicae, an organization of publishers and producers of musical 
and audiovisual recordings, that brought a suit against Telefónica, which inter 
alia provided Internet access services to Internet users. The dispute between 
the two parties arose out of Telefónica’s refusal to disclose to Promusicae 
personal data belonging to Internet users. The Spanish court decided to refer 
to the ECJ questions on how to interpret the E-commerce Directive, the 
Copyright Directive, the Sanctions Directive and directives regulating data 
protection.  
 
Although the case concerned data protection (and by extension the 
fundamental right to privacy) and not freedom of expression, the ECJ’s ruling 
is of relevance when appraising the relationship between copyright and other 
                                                
118 For further case comments, see Sims from p. 491, Angelopoulos from p. 341 and Rosén in 
Freedom of Expression in lineage with author’s rights p. 9.  
119 Case C-275/06 Promusicae.  
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fundamental rights in general. In essence, the ECJ held that a fair balance 
needs to be struck between the various fundamental rights protected by EU 
law and that the courts of Member States must interpret their national law in a 
manner that is consistent with not only relevant directives but also 
fundamental rights and other general principles of Community law, such as the 
principle of proportionality.120   
 
Then, in November 2011 and February 2012, the ECJ laid down two rulings 
that provide further guidance in respect of EU law and the enforcement of 
copyrights on the Internet. The two cases, Scarlet Extended121 and Netlog122, 
provide striking similarities in that they both feature a Belgian management 
company named SABAM seeking injunctions against intermediaries operating 
on the web. A difference between the two cases, however, is that in Scarlet 
Extended, a case initiated already in 2004, the sought injunction was targeted at 
an Internet service provider (ISP), whereas in the Netlog case, initiated in 2009, 
actions were brought against a social media network.  
 
The second case deserves some further review as it provides similarities with 
the first hypothetical example presented above. According to Netlog’s own 
website, the service provides users with the means to create personal profiles 
featuring “…blog, pictures, videos, events, playlists and much more to share 
with your friends. It is thus the ultimate tool to connect and communicate with 
your social network.”123 SABAM, representing authors, composers and 
publishers of musical and audiovisual works, claimed that the network enabled 
users to make works in its repertoire available to the public in such a way that 
other users of the network could have access to them without SABAM’s 
consent and without Netlog paying it any fee.  
 
In both cases, the sought injunctions would, in practice, impose on the 
defendants a general obligation to monitor communications on their networks. 
Moreover, in both cases the defendants would have to install filtering systems 
that would: i) be in use for an unlimited time, ii) constitute a preventive 
measure, iii) be paid for exclusively by themselves, iv) be targeted at all the 
traffic to the site and v) apply indiscriminately to everyone using the internet 
service or the social media network respectively. Given the factual and legal 
similarities between the two cases, the ECJ more or less copied its reasoning 
from Scarlet Extended when it a few months later laid down its preliminary 
ruling in Netlog.  
 
                                                
120 Case C-275/06 Promusicae, paragraph 68.  
121 C-70/10 Scarlet Extended.  
122 C-360/10 Netlog.  
123 http://sv.netlog.com/go/about.  
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In both cases, the Court recalled that copyright-holders have a right under the 
Sanctions Directive and the Copyright Directive to apply for an injunction 
against intermediaries whose services are being used by third parties to infringe 
their rights (inter alia ISPs or operators of online social networking platforms). 
Next in Scarlet Extended, the Court referred to L’Oréal124, reminding that 
intermediaries may seek such measures not only to bring to an end 
infringements already committed, but also to prevent further infringements. 
Lastly, the Court, again referring to L’Oréal, stated that the rules for the 
operation of the injunctions (i.e. procedures to be followed and conditions to 
be met) were a matter for national law. However, such national rules, and their 
application by national courts, had to observe the limitations imposed by 
relevant directives and ”the sources of law to which those directives refer”.125  
 
After presenting the legal background, the ECJ went on to conclude that 
Article 15 (1) of the E-commerce Directive prohibits measures that requires of 
an intermediary provider to carry out general monitoring of information that it 
stores on its network or that is transmitted onto its network. Furthermore, the 
ECJ stated that general monitoring obligations would not be compatible with 
Article 3 of the Sanctions Directive, which declares that measures based on 
provisions in the Directive should be fair and proportionate and not 
excessively costly.126  
 
But more importantly, the ECJ also stated that national courts must take into 
account requirements that stem from the protection of the applicable 
fundamental rights. The ECJ noted that the injunctions had been sought with 
the aim to ensure protection of copyright, and that the right to intellectual 
property is safeguarded by Article 17 (2) of the EU Charter. However, the 
Court also acknowledged that there is “…nothing whatsoever in the wording of that 
provision or in the Court’s case-law to suggest that that right is inviolable and must for that 
reason be absolutely protected.” Referring to Promusicae, the ECJ once again 
confirmed that the fundamental right to property, including intellectual 
property, must be balanced against the protection of other fundamental 
rights.127  
 
More specifically, the preliminary rulings confirm that a fair balance must be 
struck between the protection of intellectual property on the one hand, and 
fundamental rights of “individuals who are affected by such measures” on the other. 
The ECJ held that in the present cases, the fundamental right to intellectual 
property had to be balanced against the fundamental freedom to conduct 
                                                
124 C‑324/09 L’Oréal.  
125 C-70/10 Scarlet Extended paragraphs 30-33 and C-360/10 Netlog paragraphs 28-31.  
126 C-70/10 Scarlet Extended paragraphs 35-40 and C-360/10 Netlog paragraphs 33-38. 
127 C-70/10 Scarlet Extended paragraphs 41-44 and C-360/10 Netlog paragraphs 39-42. 
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business that the operators enjoyed. But moreover, the ECJ declared that the 
filtering system might also infringe the fundamental rights of the people whom 
are using these services. Accordingly, the Court invoked Articles 8 and 11 of 
the EU Charter and held that copyright-protection also had to be balanced 
against the users’ right to protection of personal data and their freedom to 
receive or impart information.128  
 
Concerning freedom of expression and freedom of information, the ECJ 
stated that the sought injunction “…could potentially undermine freedom of 
information since that system might not distinguish adequately between unlawful content and 
lawful content, with the result that its introduction could lead to the blocking of lawful 
communications. Indeed, it is not contested that the reply to the question whether a 
transmission is lawful also depends on the application of statutory exceptions to copyright 
which vary from one Member State to another. Moreover, in some Member States certain 
works fall within the public domain or can be posted online free of charge by the authors 
concerned.”129  
 
In conclusion, the ECJ ruled that in adopting the injunctions sought, the 
national court would not respect the requirement to strike a fair balance 
between conflicting fundamental rights. Hence, the answers to the referred 
questions were that the relevant Directives (the E-commerce Directive, the 
Copyright Directive, the Sanctions Directive and two directives regulating data 
protection) read together, and interpreted in the light of the requirements 
stemming from the applicable fundamental rights, precluded imposition of the 
contested injunction.130  
 
 
2.3 So a balance needs to be struck – but now 
what? 
2.3.1 Comments on recent ECJ case law 
It is telling that the ECJ’s landmark cases on the relationship between 
intellectual property rights and other fundamental rights on the Internet have 
concerned measures targeted at intermediaries and not actual infringers. This 
demonstrates the fact that, for several reasons, it is much more attractive for a 
right-holder to make a claim against an intermediary than to go after an 
individual infringer. First and foremost, it is of course more cost-efficient to 
bring action against a single intermediary than to pursue a multitude of its 
                                                
128 C-70/10 Scarlet Extended paragraphs 45-50 and C-360/10 Netlog paragraphs 43-48.  
129 C-70/10 Scarlet Extended paragraph 52 and C-360/10 Netlog paragraph 50.  
130 C-70/10 Scarlet Extended paragraphs 53-54 and C-360/10 Netlog paragraphs 51-52.  
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users. But another important reason is that by requiring action from the 
various service providers that are facilitating the infringing activities, right-
holders may be able to prevent copyright violations from happening in the first 
place.131 To what extent various measures can be imposed on Internet 
intermediaries are therefore a much-debated issue. And, as the ECJ rulings in 
Scarlet Extended and Netlog illustrates, the answer to these questions will have 
spillover effects on freedom of expression, as ‘policing’ activities assigned on 
the intermediaries may impede the freedom of expression and freedom of 
information enjoyed by its users.  
 
It has been widely acknowledged that the injunctions sought by SABAM were 
vast or even extreme in their scopes.132 Psychogiopoulou has pointed out that 
if the filtering system sought in Scarlet Extended would have been granted, 
similar actions would most certainly have been brought against other operators 
all across Europe and such a development would have put the openness of the 
Internet in serious jeopardy.133 Another important aspect, however, is that the 
ECJ only rejected the specific injunction sought by SABAM, it did not rule out 
filtering systems or blocking measures as such.134 Potentially, the ECJ may well 
accept injunctions that do not encompass all of the five elements outlined 
above.135  
 
As a comparison to Netlog and Scarlet Extended, it may be fruitful to mention 
Newzbin2136, a case decided by a British High Court in 2011. In that case, the 
Court obligated an ISP to block some user’s access to the Newzbin2 website. 
Judge Arnold, referring to Promusicae and the AG’s opinion in Scarlet Extended 
(the ECJ had yet to lay down its ruling), gave freedom of expression aspects 
due consideration. However, the website was used almost entirely for illegal file 
sharing. Moreover, as Headdon has pointed out, the injunction sought was 
circumscribed in three important ways: the domains it applied to, the persons it 
was targeted against and the technology used for implementation. 137 
Accordingly, the Court found that the sought injunction passed the 
proportionality test as the plaintiff’s right to property, according to Article 1 of 
the First Protocol to the ECHR, outweighed the right of other stakeholders to 
freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR.138  
 
                                                
131 For discussions on the benefits with launching an action against an intermediary, see for 
example Scerri & George from p. 10 onwards, Headdon p. 137 and Meale p. 429, 431.  
132 See for example Meale p. 430, Psychogiopoulou p. 555.   
133 Psychogiopoulou p. 554.  
134 Psychogiopoulou p. 555.  
135 Meale p. 431.  
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Meale has stated that for the rest of this decade, we will probably see 
procedures in which judges have to consider everything in between the 
blocking measure accepted in Newzbin2 and the general filtering system 
rejected in Scarlet Extended and Netlog. Accordingly, the ECJ will most assuredly 
be asked over and over again to establish guidelines on which sorts of 
measures are legitimate and which are not.139 However, the real battle is likely 
to move away from peer-to-peer file sharing and into the field of e.g. 
streaming.140 As for the main legal considerations in these battles, courts will, 
following the ECJ’s recent case law, not least be required to pay much 
attention to the proper balancing of fundamental rights.141 In other words, it is 
most likely that we in the near future will continue to see cases in which the 
relationship between copyright and freedom of expression is considered.      
 
 
2.3.2 What is a fair balance?  
 
As recognized in the previous section, in Scarlet Extended and Netlog the ECJ 
gave the narrowest answers possible to the questions asked by the domestic 
courts.142 Accordingly, it is difficult to draw any far-reaching conclusions from 
the rulings concerning the standing of freedom of expression aspects in 
copyright infringement cases. But in regards to the concise statements that the 
ECJ did make, Psychogiopoulou has observed that the ECJ only declared that 
the contested filtering systems could potentially violate the users’ right to 
freedom of expression. According to her, ECJ’s careful language can probably 
be explained by the considerable uncertainty that surrounded the disputed 
filtering system and its ability to make accurate distinctions between lawful and 
unlawful content. But Psychogiopoulou also sees the ECJ’s statement that the 
national court had to take into consideration ‘in particular’ the operator’s right 
to conduct business as yet another example of the more economic-oriented 
approach that permeates ECJ’s case law.143   
 
Moreover, although not a binding source of law, Advocate General Cruz 
Villalón’s opinion in Scarlet Extended (no AG opinion was given in Netlog), 
provides some food for thought in relation to freedom of expression 
considerations. The Advocate General based his opinion primarily on 
considerations in relation to the fundamental rights of the users and elaborated 
                                                
139 Meale p. 432.  
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142 Meale p. 431.  
143 Psychogiopoulou p. 554-555.  
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quite thoroughly on the freedom of expression aspect. After reformulating the 
questions referred by the domestic court so that provisions in the EU Charter 
were considered in the light of the ECHR and not the other way around, the 
AG first established that the sought injunction would come into conflict with 
Article 11 and the right to freedom of expression (as well as with the right to 
privacy).  
 
More specifically, the AG pointed out that there was no doubt that the 
contested system, in particular the blocking mechanism, would constitute a 
restriction according to said provision in the EU Charter and Article 10 of the 
ECHR. According to the AG, this was the case regardless of the efficiency and 
thoroughness of the control mechanism. However, the AG did also conclude 
that the filtering system at hand would not be able to distinguish between legal 
and illegal content in an adequate manner, as copyright law differs between 
Member States. In conclusion, the AG found that the sought measure would 
impose a restriction on freedom of expression and that it therefore had to 
fulfill the requirements laid down in Article 52 (1) of the Charter in order to be 
legitimate.144  
 
As we have seen above, one of these requirements is that any limitation must 
be provided for by law. The AG paid this requisite much attention and 
eventually concluded that the requirement was not met in the present case. 
More specifically, references were made to the case law of the ECtHR that 
demonstrates that the relevant law must inherit certain ‘qualities’. Not least, the 
application of the law must lead to results that are predictable.145 The AG 
found that, through the intermediaries’ and the Internet user’s perspective, an 
imposition of the contested filtering and blocking system would be such a 
unique and unexpected measure that this obligation had to be explicitly, clearly 
and precisely prescribed by the law.146 According to the AG, this was not the 
case with the applicable national law.  
 
Since the requirement ‘prescribed by law’ was not met, there would be no need 
for the Court to also apply the proportionality test set out in Article 52 (1) of 
the EU Charter. The AG did however state, obiter dictum, that the sought 
injunction aimed at protecting copyright and that this most certainly constitute 
an example of the “rights and freedoms of others” addressed in the 
aforementioned article. Moreover, the AG underlined that copyright itself is a 
right protected by Article 17 (2) of the EU Charter. Hence, the need to protect 
copyright could potentially motivate the restriction on other freedoms and 
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rights in accordance with Article 52 (1) of the EU Charter.147 Furthermore, the 
AG stated that, since the relevant EU Directives did not warrant the sought 
injunction, a particularly sensitive question could await, namely if the directive 
provisions in themselves violated fundamental rights enshrined in the EU 
Charter.148  
 
Furthermore, it may be noted that some scholars have speculated on how the 
ECtHR would rule on a case that involves a distinct conflict between copyright 
and freedom of expression. This is of interest since, as we have seen above, the 
ECHR is of importance when appraising the scope of protection guaranteed 
under the EU Charter and the ECtHR has yet to lay down a precedent on the 
relationship between the two rights. In an article on injunctions against ISPs, 
Sandfeld Jacobsen and Salung Petersen holds that the requisite ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ and ‘pressing social need’, may well be met in cases where 
sought injunctions provide right-holders with a means to stop large-scale 
Internet-based infringements which otherwise may be impossible to hinder.149  
 
But in concern of the requirement of proportionality, Sandfeld Jacobsen and 
Salung Petersen state that although minor limitations on freedom of expression 
may pass the test, not least when the violations of copyright are vast in scope 
and are difficult to stop by other means, the balance act is likely to fall out in 
favor of freedom of expression when restrictions are more extensive. 
Moreover, they argue that freedom of expression values are more likely to 
prevail if the sought injunction is likely to affect other persons than the actual 
infringers or when the measure will hinder a broad circle of people from 
accessing or spreading significant information of public concern.150 Similarly, 
Akester has assumed that the right to freedom of expression will overtrump 
copyright if the contested material is of public interest and users are unable to 
invoke existing exemptions in order to get access to political, journalistic, 
artistic or literary speech.151   
 
 
2.3.3 The on-going policy discussion 
Finally in this section, we shall have a look at the on-going policy discussion 
within the EU on questions relating to copyright and freedom of expression. 
Indeed, there have been some developments within the EU that suggest that 
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lawmakers are putting an enhanced focus on issues related to the balance of 
interests between copyright-holders and user’s rights in the age of web 2.0. An 
introduction to this discussion can provide us with some interesting reflections 
on the value of fundamental right provisions as external tools in copyright 
cases.  
 
Neelie Kroes,152 has recently spoken out about the importance of having a 
copyright framework in place that is adopted to cope with present challenges 
imposed by the digital age. She has acknowledged that the proposals behind 
the Copyright Directive were formulated in 1998 and that the world has 
changed dramatically since then. The most important development, according 
to Kroes, is that creation and distribution of creative works is now in the hands 
of everyone, something that inter alia has empowered people to generate and 
exchange ideas on a larger scale. Against this background, Kroes has 
questioned whether the present copyright rules “…make it easier or harder for 
people to upload and distribute their own, new creative content? And is that the best way to 
boost creativity and innovation?”. In order to answer these and other questions, the 
EU Commission has decided to examine whether further changes are 
needed.153  
 
A Communication from 2011 hints at where this overview might lead as it 
contains a section on UGC that recognizes that it might be problematic that 
“amateur” users whom create UGC for non-commercial purposes face 
infringement proceedings when uploading content without the right-holders 
consent. It is stated that “The time has come to build on the strength of copyright to act 
as a broker between rights holders and users of content in a responsible way” and that a 
dialogue with stakeholders would take place with the aim to find a balance 
between ”the rights of content creators and the need to take account of new forms of 
expression”.154  
 
Also, in the 2008 Green Paper on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy155, the EU 
Commission acknowledged that the Copyright Directive does not contain an 
exemption that allows users to create new or derivative works by using existing 
copyright-protected material. However, the consultations led to the conclusion 
that regulation on UGC would be premature as the phenomenon as such was 
still evolving.156 One year later, the General Directorate for Information 
                                                
152 Vice-President of the European Commission, responsible for the Digital Agenda. 
153 “Copyright and innovation in the Creative Industries”, speech given by Neelie Kroes at the 
2012 Intellectual Property and Innovations Summit, The Lisbon Council, Brussels 10 
September 2012. Available online at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-
592_en.htm.  
154 COM(2011) 287 final.  
155 COM (2008) 466/2.  
156 COM (2009) 532 final.  
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Society and the General Directorate for the Internal Market presented a 
Reflection Document in which it was pointed out that UGC plays a new and 
significant function as a complement to works produced by professionals. 
Hence, it was declared that: “The co-existence of these two types of content needs a 
framework designed to guarantee both freedom of expression and an appropriate 
remuneration for professional creators, who continue to play an essential role for cultural 
diversity”.157  
 
Notably, some EU Member States have also started to examine whether 
copyright law needs to be updated in order to better cope with modern 
needs.158 For instance, both the UK and Ireland have reviewed their respective 
copyright laws to assess whether it would be feasible and desirable to adopt 
exceptions for inter alia ‘fair uses’ of works.159 In this context, policymakers and 
legal experts have drawn inspiration from the United States where the legislator 
has chosen a more flexible approach when framing exceptions to copyright. 
More specifically, it has been noted that the ‘fair use’ exception in American 
copyright law provides judges with more room to correct imbalances in the 
copyright system.160 For example, American judges have applied this rule as a 
mean to provide users of the web 2.0 with stronger rights.161 Also noteworthy 
is that Canada in June 2012 modernized its copyright law by inter alia 
introducing an explicit exception for UGC besides expanding fair dealing, and 
that Australia is currently considering similar reforms.162  
 
In the Irish consultation paper, it was questioned whether current EU law 
precluded Member States from adopting a fair use provision. However, even 
though it was concluded that EU law did not necessarily preclude a fair use 
doctrine (since recent ECJ case law could allow for a liberal interpretation of 
the Copyright Directive), the authors of the consultation paper concluded that 
it was unclear whether it would be desirable to adopt a fair use doctrine in 
Ireland.163 In the UK, professor Hargreaves concluded that a wholesome 
import of fair use would be impossible given the EU’s present legal 
framework. He suggested that the UK instead could achieve many similar 
                                                
157 Creative Content in a European Digital Single Market: Challenges for the Future, a 
Reflection Document of DG INFSO and DG MARKT, 22 October 2009, p. 3-4, 10.  
158 Primarily UK, Ireland and the Netherlands.  
159 See the Professor Hargreaves Report from 2011 (UK) and the Copyright Review 
Committee’s Consultation Paper on Copyright and Innovation from 2012 (Ireland).  
160 The Hargreaves Report p. 42.   
161 Chik p. 245.  
162 See the new Canadian Copyright Modernization Act, which received Royal Assent on June 29 
2012, and the issues paper Copyright and the Digital Economy which was released by the Australian 
Law Reform Commission (ALRC) on 24 August 2012 (submissions were due by 16 November 
2012).   
163 The Irish Copyright Review Committee’s Consultation Paper on Copyright and Innovation 
p. 119-120.  
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benefits by adopting limitations already permissible under the Copyright 
Directive, inter alia by introducing an exception for parody. Furthermore it was 
recommended that the UK government should pursue their Brussels 
colleagues to consider additional copyright exceptions.164 The UK government 
has later endorsed this approach.165  
 
Legal scholars have also contributed to the debate by acknowledging problems 
related to a rigid copyright system and by presenting different solutions going 
forward. Hugenholtz and Sentfleben have argued for a more flexible copyright 
system, not least in order to promote freedom of expression aspects. 
According to Hugenholtz and Sentfleben, the present inflexibility in copyright 
law impedes such communication on the web that arguably should be 
permissible. They argue that external rules such as those protecting freedom of 
expression can contribute with some flexibility, but that new internal 
exceptions should be introduced into copyright law so that legal predictability 
and technological neutrality is also ensured. According to Hugenholtz and 
Sentfleben, the EU copyright system provides more room for such exemptions 
than a prima facie assessment gives at hand.166  
 
Mendis has also acknowledged that there is a problematic tension between 
copyright and freedom of expression in the modern information society. In 
pursuit of a proper solution to this situation, he has explored whether it is 
possible for Member States of the European Union to introduce to their 
copyright regime a broad and general public interest exemption. The rationale 
behind such a limitation on copyright would be to preserve the notion that 
copyright is a means to promote the interests of society in its entirety and that 
this goal can be better achieved by making unauthorized uses legitimate if it is 
justified by the interest of the public. Mendis argues that such an exception is 
desirable but that the Copyright Directive and its exhaustive list of exemptions 
may preclude such an introduction. If so, it is suggested that Article 10 of the 
ECHR may be invoked as a means to circumvent the restriction imposed by 
the Directive. According to Mendis, the biggest problem, however, is that the 
politicians seem to lack the will for such an adoption.167  
 
Cook too has pointed out that it may take considerable time before the EU 
amends its legal framework in a way that allows Member States to adopt more 
flexible restrictions on copyright. Therefore, he argues, it can be held that the 
EU is worse off than e.g. the United States when it comes to responding to 
new technological developments and associated business models. He has noted 
                                                
164 The Hargreaves Report p. 5.  
165 See http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresponse-full.pdf.  
166 Hugenholtz & Sentfleben.  
167 Mendis, p. 5, 15-16, 60-67 and 80-81.  
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that this has forced courts to apply inter alia provisions on freedom of 
expression in the ECHR and the EU Charter in order to find the necessary 
tools in some infringement cases. In the long run, however, he predicts that 
Europe will move towards more flexible copyright limitations, but that it is 
unlikely the EU will ever adopt a fair use provision such as the one present in 
the United States.168    
 
A somewhat different approach is taken by Angelopoulos who advocates a 
more distinct ‘externalization’ of the conflict. She argues that if we admit 
freedom of expression and copyright are at odds with each other, and that 
copyright too is a fundamental right, then the conflict moves into a new 
battleground, namely that of human rights. And this approach has several 
important consequences according to Angelopoulos: i) It places the two rights 
on an even footing, ii) it provides the judiciary with enhanced power to solve 
the conflict (it is noted that this also has a negative aspect since influence is 
moved away from the legislative body), and most importantly iii) human right 
provisions, such as Article 10 of the ECHR, inherit a balancing mechanism 
that is well suited for the double balancing act required by a court that 
considers a face-off between the two antipodal fundamental rights.169  
 
Geiger also supports a ‘constitutionalizing’ of intellectual property law. 
Although he acknowledges that it would be preferable to solve issues such as 
the conflict between copyright and freedom of expression ‘inside’ copyright 
law, he also stresses that there is much to win by recognizing copyrights’ 
human rights dimension. Geiger argues that by using fundamental rights as the 
frontier of copyright, legislators and judges can rebalance the matter. By 
extension, this can help copyright overcome the legitimacy crises it faces when 
a vast portion of the citizens of the information society does not find current 
copyright law viable. Geiger concludes that a new foundation is critical as an 
“unbalanced system is at risk of collapsing at any time”.170     
 
 
                                                
168 Cook p. 243-245.  
169 Angelopoulos from p. 351.  
170 Geiger (2009) p. 37-40, 48-49, (2007) p. 43-44 and (2006) p. 406. 
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3 Reflections  
 
3.1 What is the relationship,  de jure and de 
fac to , between copyright and freedom of 
expression in the information society?  
 
We have seen above that there are opposed opinions on the relationship 
between copyright and freedom of expression. Sometimes it has been held that 
the two rights are compatible, and other times that there is a troublesome 
conflict between them. This is perhaps not that startling as both assumptions 
certainly are true to some extent, depending on how one looks at the issue. On 
the one hand, we have seen that part of copyright’s raison d’être indeed is to 
promote freedom of expression aspects. But on the other hand, it is perfectly 
clear that the relationship carries a built-in conflict as copyright simply imposes 
a restriction on others’ right to express themselves and to receive and impart 
information. Moreover, the idea/expression dichotomy in copyright law may 
well ensure that a vast majority of speech completely avoids the sphere of 
copyright, but it is simultaneously beyond doubt that some of it does not as 
people sometimes, for various reasons, choose to partly or fully echo 
copyright-protected expressions.  
 
Many times, it is of course manifest that such dispositions should be 
considered unlawful and that the infringer should be held accountable if none 
of the existing exceptions are applicable. However, sometimes the contested 
expression may constitute comments that are clearly safeguarded by the 
various examined human rights instruments. For instance, sometimes people 
may want to exercise their freedom of expression by using the complete work 
of someone else, or such a significant portion that the exception for e.g. 
quotation is inapplicable, in order to spread important information (as in 
Ashdown). For example, sharing of such information can be crucial in order to 
facilitate public debates on topical matters of political significance. And as we 
have seen above, such political expressions enjoy a particularly strong 
protection by the ECHR and thus also by Article 11 of the EU Charter. To 
name another example, copyright-protected material can be used by third 
parties when they ‘participate in the cultural life of the community’ (a formulation 
found in the UDHR and the ICESCR) by creating a derivative work that 
others can enjoy (as in Germania 3). Such dispositions can also give rise to a 
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potential conflict as artistic expressions undoubtedly fall under Article 10 of 
the ECHR and, by extension, Article 11 of the EU Charter.   
 
It is when a court finds that the contested action constitutes an exercise of 
freedom of expression that deserves protection, but that none of the 
exceptions existing within copyright law are applicable, that a true, and 
external, conflict between copyright and freedom of expression emerges. 
Interestingly, this is a conflict that has a twofold constitutional dimension. 
Indeed, one should not overlook that copyright too constitutes a fundamental 
right according to the EU Charter, ECHR and national constitutions such as 
the Swedish GF. For what its worth, copyrights’ position as a fundamental 
right has been somewhat clarified by the new EU Charter since that 
instrument, contrary to the ECHR, explicitly mentions that intellectual 
property rights shall be protected. Adding this to the analysis, it becomes clear 
that the relationship between copyright and freedom of expressions is an 
intricate one, which inherits a potential conflict between two rights both 
categorized as ‘fundamental’.  
 
Although it has been noted that this conflict-oriented dimension of the 
relationship has been largely ignored in Europe for a long time, it is not a 
novelty as such. Indeed, above we have seen cases from decades ago in which 
defendants invoked freedom of expression arguments in copyright disputes. 
But recently, the issue has required much larger attention as the friction 
between the two rights has increased significantly in the information society. 
As we have seen, this has a twofold explanation. First, when harmonizing 
central aspects of copyright, Europe introduced wider and stronger copyright 
protection. Then, after that extensive and rigid copyright system was put in 
place, new behaviors enabled by innovative web-based technologies have 
arguably increased the justification of copyright-related activities on the 
Internet, the main ‘marketplace of ideas’ of our time.  
 
More specifically, freedom of expression aspects become present to a much 
larger degree when focus is shifted from flagrant infringements in the form of 
piracy and ‘pure’ illegal downloading and file-sharing, to the usage of copyright 
material in ‘conversational media’ and various forms of user-generated content. 
The Internet has simply empowered ordinary citizens with the platforms to, on 
the one hand, receive and impart information on an unprecedented scale and 
to more easily share e.g. political and artistic expressions with large audiences. 
On the other hand, the idea/expression dichotomy has become a more hallow 
watershed between the two rights since the same web technologies have made 
it much easier and tempting for third parties to copy protected material and 
make it available to the public in a way that violates other’s exclusive rights. In 
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essence, it has become more common that ordinary citizens infringe copyright 
in a way that simultaneously actualizes freedom of expression aspects.  
 
With that said, it is clear that the intersection between copyright and freedom 
of expression presents a potential de jure conflict between two fundamental 
rights which de facto concerns a broad circle of people.  
 
 
3.2 Can the constitutional right to freedom of 
expression successfully be invoked as a 
defense in a copyright infringement case? 
 
A delicate issue of enhanced significance then is whether the conflict between 
copyright and freedom of expression has been appropriately solved once and 
for all through the various limitations imposed upon copyright by the legislator 
within private copyright law (the ‘internal solution’), or if a defendant who is 
unable to invoke existing exceptions nevertheless may escape liability or 
sanctions by invoking his or her constitutional right to freedom of expression 
(the ‘external solution’).     
 
Case law from Sweden illustrates unambiguously that Swedish courts so far 
have refrained from applying constitutional provisions on freedom of 
expression as an external tool. As we have seen, this has been the case 
regardless of whether the interest to safeguard freedom of expression has 
manifestly overtrumped the interest to protect copyright (the Manifesto case) 
and notwithstanding if the dispute has concerned a critical political comment, 
something that adheres to the very core of freedom of expression (Swedish 
Flag). Seemingly, this pattern has different explanations.  
 
First, the Swedish Supreme Court lacks the power of a constitutional court and 
at the time when the referred judgments were laid down, it had the authority to 
set aside statutory law only if it manifestly contradicted with the constitution. 
And if we also consider that copyright is explicitly exempted from the FPA and 
the FEA (and arguably falls outside the scope of the GF too), it is obvious that 
the Swedish courts traditionally have had little room to apply the constitutional 
right to freedom of expression in copyright cases. For example, this fact is 
clearly demonstrated by the Supreme Courts’ reasoning in the Manifesto case, 
where the Court acknowledged that a considerable freedom of expression 
interest was at hand, but stated that it was up to the legislator to introduce new 
exceptions.  
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Another reason is that, in general, Swedish courts have been reluctant to take 
heed to constitutional rights in private disputes and the referred cases 
demonstrate that copyright procedures provide no exceptions. This element is 
most prevalent in Swedish Flag, in which the Supreme Court stressed that 
copyright protects private interests when dismissing the defendant’s argument. 
Also, the reasoning in Manifesto does to some extent illustrate this standing as 
the Court concluded that it could apply a provision in the Penal Code when 
facing a dire need to declare an infringement non-punishable due to extreme 
free speech interests, not the constitutional provisions safeguarding freedom of 
expression (the constitutional provisions were regarded as ‘illustrative’ rather 
than ‘applicable’). However, in Mein Kampf, the Court acknowledged that the 
ECHR could present a legal basis for arguments that an infringement should be 
declared non-punishable due to exceptional freedom of expression concerns. 
Noteworthy, this corresponds with the notion that the incorporation of the 
ECHR into domestic law has cleared the way for a stronger focus on 
fundamental rights also in private disputes.  
 
However, the Swedish courts have yet to apply Article 10 of the ECHR in a 
case regarding copyright infringement. In Mein Kampf, the Court abstained 
from applying the convention provision since the freedom of expression 
argument was regarded as insufficiently persuasive. This holding could in part 
stem from the fact that the ECtHR has yet to rule on the relationship between 
copyright and freedom of expression. If a precedent from the Strasbourg court 
clearly showed that Article 10 of the ECHR constitutes a frontier in relation to 
copyright protection, national courts would surely be encouraged to pay more 
attention to arguments related to the constitutional right of freedom of 
expression.  
 
However, we have seen that Europe today has an intricate and pluralistic 
system of human rights protections that also involve the EU Charter. And 
since central aspects of copyright law have been harmonized within the EU in 
recent time, important issues related to the subject matter have entered into a 
new arena. More specifically, the relationship between copyright and other 
fundamental rights such as freedom of expression can nowadays depend on 
considerations made by the judges in Luxembourg. Seen against the backdrop 
of Swedish case law, this development brings new light on the intersection 
between the two fundamental rights, since the ECJ can have a different 
approach to the issues at hand.  
 
As for whether the ECJ has cleared the way for an externalization of the 
conflict or not, it can at the outset be noted that the Court in Scarlet Extended 
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and Netlog held that the sought injunction potentially could undermine freedom 
of information since the contested system would not be able to distinguish 
between lawful and unlawful content in a satisfactory way. Furthermore in that 
passage, the ECJ underlined that the lawfulness of a transmission also 
depended on statutory exemptions that varied from one Member State to 
another. These statements in themselves do not give a clear answer as to 
whether the ECJ supports external application of fundamental rights 
provisions or not. In fact, the focus on lawful and unlawful content and the 
reference to domestic statutory exemptions also support the more strict 
internalized solution.  
 
However, the intrinsic element in Promusicae, Scarlet Extended and Netlog is, at 
least as far as the subject of this thesis is concerned, that intellectual property 
rights are not inviolable, that they must not be absolutely protected, and that a 
balance needs to be struck between copyright and other fundamental rights such as freedom of 
expression. Moreover, the ECJ referred to Article 17 (2) of the EU Charter on 
the one hand, and Article 11 of the EU Charter on the other, when holding 
that copyright-protection shall be balanced against other individuals’ right to 
inter alia freedom of expression and freedom of information. Accordingly, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the ECJ has established that national courts 
need to acknowledge that there can be an ‘external’ conflict between these two 
fundamental rights and that this clash, when it falls within the scope of EU 
law, must be solved by application of the tools provided for by the EU 
Charter.  
 
A closely related conclusion is that the ECJ seemingly does not hesitate to let 
fundamental rights affect the outcome of disputes between private subjects. In 
Promusicae, Scarlet Extended and Netlog, the ECJ stated that national authorities 
and courts must perform the required balance act between relevant 
fundamental rights when applying legislation that stems from EU directives. 
Noteworthy, the ECJ did not even question whether or not the relevant EU 
Charter provisions could be applied in disputes between private parties. 
Moreover and interesting enough, the aforementioned preliminary rulings also 
removed doubts as to whether not only equal treatment provisions but also 
other fundamental rights enshrined in the EU Charter have horizontal effects.  
 
Put simply, the ECJ seems to acknowledge that the national courts are 
representing the Member States when they enforce rules upon private subjects 
through judicial proceedings and, by extension, that the courts in that manner 
are implementing Union law in accordance with Article 51 (1) of the EU 
Charter. Hence, the ECJ paid no regard to the fact that the parties to the 
domestic cases were two private subjects, not a State and an individual. 
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Moreover, it can be noted that the domestic courts had to pay respect to the 
rights of “individuals who are affected by such measures” and that this also included 
those who were using the defendants’ services. Accordingly, the ECJ also 
confirmed that third party interests must be taken into account when 
appropriate.  
 
Indeed, the ECJ’s task in these preliminary rulings is to evaluate whether rules 
should be interpreted in a certain manner or set aside due to the fact that they 
are in conflict with a superior EU norm. Given the fact that EU primary law 
nowadays include a legally binding “bill of rights”, the ECJ more or less 
resembles a European constitutional court within the context of EU law. 
Therefore, it should perhaps come as no surprise that the issues at hand are 
less dramatic to the ECJ than to those domestic courts that are lacking the 
same authority against respective legislators. By extension, national judges can 
now invoke the guidance provided by the ECJ when addressing future 
conflicts between copyright and freedom of expression, which possibly makes 
the issue less dramatic also in the eyes of domestic judges. This is not least 
important since, again, the ECtHR has yet to rule on the relationship between 
copyright and freedom of expression.  
 
But before drawing any more far-reaching conclusions one must also 
acknowledge that the ECJ in fact has provided minimal guidance on how the 
balance between copyright and other fundamental rights should be struck, 
besides holding that accepting the contested filtering systems would violate e.g. 
Article 11 of the EU Charter. And although it is telling that the conflict 
between the two fundamental rights emerged when the judiciary considered 
how far a copyright-holder can be allowed to go in order to protect his right by 
injunctions targeted against intermediaries (as we have seen, such injunctions 
are arguably the most efficient means available to copyright-holders, but it may 
in practice impose a censorship on speech), it makes it somewhat harder to 
draw conclusions on the persuasiveness of freedom of expression arguments in 
copyright disputes.  
 
More specifically, one factor that likely contributed to the fact that the ECJ 
could keep its reasoning on freedom of expression to a minimum was that 
freedom of expression did not stand on its own two feet against copyright, so 
to speak, as it was accompanied by the intermediaries’ right to conduct 
business and the user’s right to privacy. Another significant consequence of the 
fact that the referred cases concerned injunctions targeted against 
intermediaries in order to prevent further infringements is that we can only 
speculate in what sorts of expressions that would have been impeded should 
the injunction have been granted. In the Netlog case, the defendant ran a 
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Facebook-like service that facilitated activities that arguably brought interesting 
freedom of expression aspects up to the surface. It is therefore regrettable that 
the ECJ did not have a closer look on the relationship between UGC, 
copyright and freedom of expression.  
 
But it must of course also be remembered that the relationship between 
copyright and freedom of expression can be considered not only in the context 
of procedural provisions, but also when a court applies substantive liability 
rules. Indeed, as we saw when examining case law from some EU Member 
States, freedom of expression arguments can be assimilated in various ways; in 
order to set aside copyright law in a specific case, in order to interpret existing 
copyright exceptions liberally or, as we have seen in the cases decided by the 
ECJ and in Ashdown, to dismiss a request for a certain sanction (such as an 
injunction that censors speech). An interesting question is therefore whether 
the harmonization of copyright in the form of directives and the enactment of 
the EU Charter also brings new light to the question on whether or not dire 
freedom of expression aspects can allow a court to declare an otherwise 
infringing action as permissible, thus preventing the right-holder from claiming 
any sanction whatsoever.  
 
It shall be noted that the ECJ has not yet been asked to rule on the 
compatibility between the Copyright Directive’s rights and exceptions as such 
and freedom of expression.171 But nevertheless, it is an interesting thing in itself 
that, to the extent clashes between copyright and freedom of expression falls 
within the scope of EU law, the question on whether a conflict can be solved 
‘internally’ or ‘externally’ no longer only is a matter of whether higher-ranking 
national constitutional provisions should affect the application of domestic 
copyright rules, but also a matter of whether a judicial review on the 
conformity of EU secondary law with EU primary law should be undertaken. 
Therefore, it can reasonably again be recognized that the core lesson from the 
referred cases, most clearly expressed in paragraph 68 of Promusicae, is that 
national courts, when ruling on copyright cases that actualize rules contained in 
EU directives, must ensure that such provisions are not applied in a manner 
that violates fundamental rights enshrined in the EU Charter. This view also 
corresponds with Recitals 31 of the Copyright Directive that underlines that a 
fair balance must be struck between right-holders and users of protected 
subject-matter.   
 
                                                
171 The closest we get is Case C-145/10 Painer, laid down on 1 December 2011, in which the 
ECJ was asked to rule on whether the publication of a photograph by the media was 
permissible since the purpose of the publication was to assist the police authority in a criminal 
investigation.  
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Against that backdrop, it seems reasonable to conclude that, since the national 
court would act ‘within the scope of EU law’ also when applying provisions 
that stem from the Copyright Directive’s articles on rights and exceptions, it 
will have to pay due respect to fundamental rights enshrined in the EU Charter 
also in such situations. And since EU law is superior even to provisions 
enshrined in national constitutions, it is no longer sufficient to solely refer to 
provisions in the Swedish constitution and statements in the domestic travaux 
préparatoire when assessing a defendants’ claim that an action should be 
declared permissible due to freedom of expression aspects. Also, it is worth 
noting, again, that the rights of the EU Charter can affect the outcome in cases 
that regards provisions that regulate relationships between private parties. If 
anything, a national court should keep in mind that it may be necessary to ask 
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on cases that present such strong freedom of 
expression aspects that it could be on the map to e.g conduct a liberal 
application of exceptions enlisted in Article 5 of the Copyright Directive.   
 
However, regardless of whether freedom of expression values are accounted 
for in the context of substantive or procedural law, the balance act between 
copyright and freedom of expression will likely be performed in the form of a 
proportionality test (however, in AG Villalóns opinion, the injunction sought 
by SABAM was regarded as such an unique measure that it did not even fulfill 
the requisite “prescribed by law”). As for procedural law applicable when a 
court assesses whether to grant an injunction, we have seen above that such a 
requisite already stems from general principles of Swedish law. The interesting 
thing then is the finding that also fundamental rights enshrined in the EU 
Charter shall be weighed on the scale when appropriate (including those 
protecting third party interests). However, in the case of substantive law, the 
balance of interests prerequisite stems only from Article 52 (1) of the EU 
Charter, Article 10 (2) of the ECHR and ECtHR case law.  
 
It is of course up to the national courts to strike the balance in each individual 
case. However, as is obvious from the discussion in previous sections, the ECJ 
will likely be asked to present further guidance on the proper balance between 
copyright and freedom of expression in the years ahead. Since the ECtHR has 
provided no guidance on the matter, the ECJ has plenty of room to give its 
“own view” on what national courts need to consider. As we have seen above, 
Psychogiopoulou has pointed out that the ECJ held in Scarlet Extended and 
Netlog that national courts had to respect ‘in particular’ the defendants right to 
conduct a business, and that this underscores ECJ’s more economic approach 
to fundamental rights. If it is correct to assume that, in general, the ECJ takes 
special heed to economic rights, than it could possibly be predicted that the 
ECJ would find the need to protect copyright (a right that indeed has been 
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protected by several EU directives in order to ensure the EU’s competiveness 
in the global knowledge economy) very dire even when a political right such as 
freedom of expression is at stake. If so, it could be argued that the ECJ would 
possibly strike the balance in a different way than the ECtHR would in a 
similar case.  
 
However, the assumption that the ECJ would favor copyright over freedom of 
expression per se can be questioned for several reasons. First, as regards the 
statement made by the ECJ in Scarlet Extended and Netlog, it could also be 
concluded that the Court in this regard actually noticed, albeit implicitly, that 
the users of the services were not part to the case and that the domestic court 
primarily had to consider the defendants interest before turning to third party 
interests. Second, in the common cases where a right-holder goes after 
infringers by requiring actions from intermediaries, it can again be noted that 
freedom of expression values will “team up” with a fundamental economic 
right (the right to conduct a business), which perhaps neutralizes the effect of 
an economic approach.  
 
Third, even though the ECtHR has not ruled on the conflict between 
copyright and freedom of expression as such, it has laid down many rulings on 
the permissibility of restrictions on freedom of speech and as we have seen, the 
Strasbourg court tends to interpret these limitations restrictively. The ECJ is 
bound to pay due regard to ECtHR’s guidance in this respect. Fourth, even if it 
would be correct to hold that the ECJ traditionally tend to find economic 
rights particularly defendable, it is perhaps in order to point out that it remains 
to be seen how ECJ case law is affected by the enactment of the EU Charter 
and the increased visibility of political rights. Seemingly, the only thing certain 
is that it will be interesting to follow how the courts will carve out the proper 
balance between copyright and freedom of expression in the years ahead.  
 
In sum then, it seems reasonable to conclude that the harmonization of central 
aspects of copyright law within the EU, and the fact that fundamental rights 
today enjoy a strong and visible protection by supranational instruments 
directly applicable in domestic courts, have removed some barriers that in the 
past have forced inter alia Swedish courts to reject freedom of expression 
defenses in copyright disputes. However, to what extent arguments based on 
the constitutional right to freedom of expression can be successfully invoked in 
cases less obvious than Scarlet Extended and Netlog, meaning that the aspect not 
only is taken seriously but indeed helps the defendant to avoid liability or a 
certain sanction, is hard to predict in the absence of further precedents from 
the ECJ and the ECtHR. The persuasiveness of freedom of expression 
arguments will therefore heavily depend on how domestic courts assess the 
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circumstances present in each individual case and on how they apply 
constitutional provisions governing fundamental rights. However, if a freedom 
of expression argument is of such magnitude that it possibly could require 
considerations on how to balance rights enshrined in the EU Charter 
(interpreted in accordance with the ECHR) against each other, domestic courts 
may or should ask the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. 
 
 
 
3.3 What are the consequences of applying, or 
not applying, the constitutional right to 
freedom of expression in copyright 
infringement cases? 
 
The examination of case law from various European courts proves that cases 
can arise in which a contested act does not fall in under any of the existing 
statutory copyright exceptions, but where a present freedom of expression 
aspect is of such dignity that it arguably could overtrump the interest of 
protecting copyright. These cases are of course troublesome for judges, given 
the fact that the court is asked upon to punish an action that actualize a value 
that belongs to the very cornerstones of a democracy. It shall therefore be 
welcomed that the development goes towards an increased acceptance for the 
horizontal effect of the fundamental right to freedom of expression in 
copyright cases. 
 
Indeed, seen through the perspective of the subject who is exercising the right 
to freedom of expression, it would be hard to understand why a court should 
be allowed to “contribute” to the imposition of a restriction on this basic right 
only because the plaintiff is a private subject (quite likely a strong company) 
and not a state actor, not least since the court itself is an organ of the state.172 
Hence, the constitutional right to freedom of expression can constitute an 
important external tool, or lifebuoy as Hugenholtz has expressed it, which 
leaves courts and defendants in a less awkward position. At the same time, 
since copyright too is a fundamental right, the plaintiff may also have some 
benefits from the horizontal effects of fundamental rights in copyright disputes 
since, as Angelopoulos has noted, the two rights will be placed on an even 
footing.  
                                                
172 A standpoint that corresponds with Westberg’s reasoning in Privaträttsliga kontrakt och 
regeringsformen, see footnote 30.  
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Furthermore, given the fact that the friction between copyright and freedom of 
expression has increased in recent time, it seems reasonable to conclude that so 
has the necessity of a horizontal application of these fundamental rights. Not 
least, this is demonstrated by the on-going policy discussion within the EU and 
in the legal doctrine. As we have seen, it seems to be widely acknowledged that 
the existing statutory exceptions within copyright law has become less adequate 
means by which to strike a proper balance between the two rights in the 
information society. And although this de lege ferenda discussion should not 
encourage a court to act prematurely and reach conclusions that are not in line 
with the current law, it does indeed highlight the importance of using all tools 
in the toolbox, including constitutional rights, in order to accommodate 
concerns related to freedom of expression. And while we have seen above that 
the Supreme Court of Sweden has acknowledged that in exceptional cases it 
could be forced to apply a provision in the Penal Code that regulates acts 
committed out of necessity, it would arguably be more appropriate to apply 
constitutional provisions in these situations.    
 
The presentation above also unveils that the legislation in many Western 
countries provide more flexible exceptions within copyright law than does the 
EU copyright system. It may therefore be concluded that European courts are 
less properly equipped to balance the interests of copyright-holders against 
freedom of expression concerns in general and to meet the challenges imposed 
by new web technology in particular. By applying fundamental right provisions, 
courts could to some extent make up for this fact. Indeed, the lead words in 
the current policy-discussion seem to be ‘balance’ and ‘flexibility’. And as 
Angelopoulos has pointed out, an externalization of the conflict will achieve 
just that as Article 51 (1) of the EU Charter and Article 10 of the ECHR 
inherits balancing mechanisms. Also, we have seen above that Article 27 (1) of 
the UDHR and Article 15 of ICESCR provides for a flexible and balanced 
approach. Accordingly, fundamental rights instruments are seemingly well 
equipped to provide the flexible tools that the European copyright system 
seems to lack. 
 
But with that said, it must also be acknowledged that a ‘constitutionalizing’ of a 
conflict per definition requires a true conflict. In other words, it seems 
appropriate after outlining the conclusions above to recognize that the starting 
point is, of course, that an action constitute an infringement and should be 
remedied accordingly if none of the statutory exceptions are applicable and 
that application of the fundamental right to freedom of expression reasonably 
should occur only in exceptional cases in which such interests are truly 
substantial. Indeed, a too frequent and broad application of the constitutional 
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right to freedom of expression would certainly be at the expanse of legal 
predictability, which would be to the detriment of not only copyright-holders 
but also the users. Last but not least, the fact that a constitutionalizing of the 
conflict empowers the judiciary with enhanced discretion can be seen as a 
troublesome consequence since it moves the decision on how to strike a 
balance between two fundamental rights away from the democratically elected 
lawmaker and into the hands of the judges. Therefore, judges should remain 
cautious when considering these external solutions.  
 
Moreover, the lawmaker should as a minimum be encouraged to provide clear 
guidance on under what circumstances a conflict between copyright and 
freedom of expression should be elevated to the human rights level and what 
factors a court needs to consider when performing the balance act. For 
example, what sorts of freedom of expression aspects are of such magnitude 
that they could possibly overtrump the interest of safeguarding copyright? And 
is it sufficient that the freedom of expression value at stake is significant or is it 
also necessary that the copyright-holder’s interest at the same time is weak? 
Also, a particularly sensitive question is of course how a court should solve 
situations where a sought injunction is targeted against future, large-scale, 
actions that cannot be easily overlooked or predicted and where the impacts on 
the respective rights therefore are immeasurable. 
 
 
3.4 Reflections on the hypothetical cases 
 
Obviously, the first hypothetical case presents striking similarities with the 
Netlog case. Accordingly, it follows from ECJ case law that the national court 
would have to take the defendant’s argument (which concerns the rights of 
third parties) seriously and assess whether issuance of the injunction would 
violate Article 11 of the EU Charter. It would of course not be a matter of 
striking down copyright law as such, but rather to examine whether how far a 
copyright-holder is allowed to go in order to safeguard his right and to evaluate 
whether a strict application of copyright law in the present case would impede 
freedom of expression in an unreasonable way.  
 
In this case, the sought injunction is circumscribed in several important ways 
compared to the one sought in Scarlet Extended and Netlog. Not least, the 
copyright-holder has offered to bear half of the cost and the system would 
only be monitoring activities by some of the users. It is therefore likely that the 
national court would have to ask the ECJ for a new preliminary ruling. And 
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although freedom of expression aspects would likely “team up” with other 
fundamental rights also in this case, the clash between the two rights discussed 
in this thesis would perhaps be more distinct (especially if the sought measure 
would not impose a general monitoring requirement on the intermediary, 
whereby EU secondary law does indeed provide a basis for the claim). 
Possibly, the ECJ would have to further elaborate on what freedom of 
expression related consequences a sanction that in practice leaves the 
assignment of censoring user-generated content to a technical system would 
cause.   
 
The second hypothetical case is interesting since it concerns such a 
neighboring right that more recently was granted status as an ‘exclusive right’ 
according to the the Copyright Directive and the SCA. Also, it demonstrates 
how the web has empowered ordinary citizens with new and effective means 
by which to exchange important ideas and information in a way that promotes 
freedom of expression whilst at the same time is harming copyright-holders.173 
However, the case represents a “traditional” conflict between the interest of 
the copyright-holder and the interest of the public in freedom of expression, 
which has much in common with the referred Swedish case law. Seen only 
against the backdrop of e.g. the Manifesto case, it is difficult to see that a Swedish 
court would invoke the defendants’ constitutional right to freedom of 
expression and declare the act permissible.  
 
But since Article 11 of the EU Charter and Article 10 of the ECHR could 
protect the publication of the video clip, and as the copyright-holder seemingly 
has not suffered any economic loss because of the publication, it can be put 
into question whether rights and exceptions stemming from provisions in the 
Copyright Directive should be applied and interpreted accordingly. Arguably 
then, the court should refer the case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling that 
could provide much needed guidance on the closer relationship between 
copyright and freedom of expression in the European Union.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
173 It can be noted that the mere posting of someone else’s film does not fall in under the 
definition of ‘UGC’ presented above, but that the blog post as such potentially can do that 
since the posting is accompanied by personal comments. However, whether we are dealing 
with UGC or not in this hypothetical case is, legally speaking, irrelevant in the absence of 
exceptions that directly exempts such dispositions from the scope of copyright protection.  
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